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ABSTRACT

A new kind of international regulatory system is
spontaneously arising out of the failure of international "Old
Governance" (i.e., treaties and intergovernmentalorganizations)
business.
international
regulate
to
adequately
Nongovernmental organizations, business firms, and other
actors, singly and in novel combinations, are creating
innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to
business. These institutions are predominantly private and
operate through voluntary standards. The Authors depict the
diversity of these new regulatory institutions on the "Governance
Triangle," according to the roles of different actors in their
operations. To analyze this complex system, we adapt the
domestic "New Governance" model of regulation to the
"Transnational New Governance"
international setting.
potentially provides many benefits of New Governance and is
particularly suitable for international regulation because it
demands less of states and intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs). However, TransnationalNew Governance does require
states and IGOs to act as orchestrators of the international
regulatory system, and that system currently suffers from a
significant orchestration deficit. If states and IGOs expanded
"directive" and especially "facilitative" orchestration of the
Transnational New Governance system, they could strengthen
high-quality private regulatory standards, improve the
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international regulatory system, and better achieve their own
regulatorygoals.
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STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Regulation of transnational business has become a dynamic area
of international governance. 1
Nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) have demanded stricter regulation of international firms and
their suppliers, 2 especially with regard to worker rights, human
3
rights, and the environment-the areas addressed in this Article.
Revelations of politically salient problems such as sweatshops and
child labor, and high-profile crises such as the Bhopal disaster and
Exxon Valdez oil spill,4 have stimulated significant public support for

1.
The developments analyzed here have occurred over the past two decades.
They build on a smaller wave of international regulatory action in the 1970s, spurred
by concern over the power of multinational enterprises.
2.
The tactics by which NGOs influence international decision makers are the
subject of a substantial body of literature. See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN
SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1998) (discussing the influence of transnational NGO networks on issues
such as human rights, the environment, and violence against women); Ann Florini &
P.J. Simmons, What the World Needs Now?, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY (Ann Florini ed., 2000) (stating that NGOs are involved
in a "wide range of decision-making processes" including international security, human
rights, and the environment); Richard Price, TransnationalCivil Society and Advocacy
in World Politics, 55 WORLD POL. 579, 580-81 (2003) (describing the role of privatelyorganized public interest activist groups in political advocacy); Thomas Risse,
TransnationalActors and World Politics, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
255, 255, 268-69 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002); see also Ronnie Lipschutz,
Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society, 21 MILLENNIUM
J. OF INT'L STUD. 389, 415 (1992). In the areas discussed here, NGOs mounted "social
movement campaigns" to create public and stakeholder pressure, often around
corporate scandals. Erika N. Sasser et al., Direct Targeting as an NGO Political
Strategy: Examining PrivateAuthority Regimes in the Forest Sector, BUS. & POL., Dec.
2006, at 1, available at http://www.bepress.coml bap/vol8/iss3/artl. Social movement
campaigns used market- and media-based strategies to pressure specific firms,
industries (e.g., chemicals, tropical timber), and "downstream" firms (e.g., retailers that
could impose standards on suppliers). Id. at 3-4; see Tim Bartley, Institutional
Emergence in an Era of Globalization:The Rise of TransnationalPrivate Regulation of
Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOCIOL. 297, 300, 319 (2007)
(analyzing successful campaigns, including efforts against Nike's labor conditions and
efforts to increase environmental friendliness of timber products); cf. Orly Lobel, Big
Box Benefits: The Targeting of Giants in a National Campaign to Raise Work
Conditions, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1685 (2007) (analyzing domestic campaigns to target
major symbolic firms such as Wal-Mart).
3.
These areas reflect a broad consensus on the need for regulation. See
Wesley Cragg, Multinational Corporations, Globalisation,and the Challenge of SelfRegulation, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 213, 215-17 (John J. Kirton & Michael J.
Trebilcock eds., 2004).
4.
For discussion of such "demonstration effects" in stimulating demand for
regulation, see Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit?: Explaining
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these demands. Yet business has, for the most part, vigorously
resisted mandatory (and even less than mandatory 5) regulation in
these areas, even as an increasing number of large firms 6 have
responded to public demand, reputational concerns, and the
possibility of "win-win" innovations 7 to embrace corporate social
responsibility,8 self-regulation, 9 and stronger requirements for
suppliers. 10
In addition, the evolving structures of global

Regulatory Change in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter
Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., forthcoming 2009).
5.
See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the
Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Draft
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (May 30,
2003) [hereinafter Draft Norms]. Business opposed the Draft Norms approved by the
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights-a subsidiary
body of the then-Human Rights Commission. See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and
Human Rights: The Evolving InternationalAgenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 821 (2007);
David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporationsand Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 901, 903 (2003). Supporters in the Sub-Commission argued that the Norms
were "non-voluntary," drawing legal authority from human rights treaties. That
position appears to go beyond settled international law, see Ruggie, supra, at 827, 832,
and the principal drafter of the Norms, David Weissbrodt, now describes them as
"consistent with the progressive development of international law." David Weissbrodt,
InternationalStandard-Settingon the Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses, 26
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 373, 382 (2008).
6.
In a survey of the Fortune Global 500 by the UN Secretary-General's
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, virtually all respondents
indicated that they had human rights policies or management practices in place.
Ruggie, supranote 5, at 836.
7.
In "win-win" situations, a firm's responses to social or environmental
problems also increase its profits. See ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE
VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY
REGULATIONS 48 (2006).
8.
David Vogel distinguishes "new" corporate social responsibility, in which
firms address social and environmental externalities of their business practices with an
eye to increasing profits, from "old" corporate social responsibility, involving
philanthropy largely unrelated to core operations and motivated by corporate
citizenship. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 17-24 (2005).
9.
Some firms have tried to avert mandatory regulation by instituting largely
symbolic codes of conduct, some of which have been exposed as shams. See Bartley,
supra note 2, at 327-28 (stating that "shoddy" symbolic responses by the garment
industry have been challenged and exposed). Business does support regulation that
facilitates its activities-e.g., the trade-liberalizing rules of the WTO-and individual
firms support regulations that benefit them economically. Id. at 333-34.
10.
In a potentially significant recent example, Wal-Mart announced new
social and environmental requirements for foreign suppliers at a "sustainability
summit" in Beijing on October 22, 2008. See Press Release, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., WalMart Announces Global Responsible Sourcing Initiative at China Summit (Oct. 22,
2008), availableat http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/NewsRoom/8696.aspx.
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production-multinational enterprises and global supply chains"pose major challenges for conventional "regulation": action by the
state or, at the international level, by groups of states, acting
primarily through treaty-based intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs) to control the conduct of economic actors through mandatory
legal rules with monitoring and coercive enforcement. 12 As these
opposing forces have collided, actors on all sides have established a
plethora of innovative institutions,' 3 with the expressed goal of
controlling global production 14 through transnational norms 15 that
16
apply directly to firms and other economic operators.
The new regulatory initiatives have two particularly striking
features. 17 The first is the central role of private actors, operating
singly and through novel collaborations, and the correspondingly
modest and largely indirect role of "the state."' 8 Unlike traditional
inter-state treaties and IGOs, 19 and unlike transgovernmental
networks of state officials, 20 most of these arrangements are governed
by (1) firms and industry groups whose own practices or those of
supplier firms are the targets of regulation; (2) NGOs and other civil
society groups, including labor unions and socially responsible

11.
"[S]eventy-seven thousand transnational firms span the global economy
today, with some 770,000 subsidiaries and millions of suppliers-Wal-Mart alone is
reported to have more than sixty thousand suppliers." Ruggie, supra note 5, at 823.
12.
Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understandingthe Role of Regulation
and Self-Regulation in a "Post-Regulatory" World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103,
128-40 (2001) (reviewing other definitions of "regulation").
13.
Many institutions were newly created to adopt regulatory standards; where
appropriate institutions (e.g., NGOs and industry associations) already existed, only
the standards were newly created.
14.
Most of the new institutions are primarily concerned with transnational
business. Other actors, including universities, landowners, and government agencies,
also adhere to certain schemes.
15.
Stepan Wood notes that the new institutions and rules are "normative" in
two senses: they both prescribe and standardize behavior. Stepan Wood, Voluntary
Environmental Codes and Sustainability,in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY

229, 230 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006).
16.
See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 15, 23-24 (2005).
17.
Referring to sustainable forestry schemes, BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL.,
GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-

STATE AUTHORITY 4 (2004), describes these arrangements as "one of the most
innovative and startling institutional designs of the past 50 years."
18.
In the transnational context, we use the abstract concept of "the state" to
refer to actions both by individual states and by groups of states acting in ad hoc
fashion or through IGOs.
19.
The regulatory powers of IGOs have also evolved, often dramatically. See
Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: Global Governance as Administration-National
and TransnationalApproaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
1, 2 (2005).
20.

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 10 (2004).
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investors; 21 and (3) combinations of actors from these two
categories. 22 States and IGOs support and even participate in some
largely private schemes, yet the state is not central to their
governance or operations.23 Other arrangements resemble publicprivate partnerships, with states or IGOs collaborating on a more or
less equal footing with private actors. Finally, a few IGOs-including
the United Nations, through its Global Compact, and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
through its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises-have adopted
norms for business conduct that aim to influence firms directly (as
opposed to indirectly, through rules governing states). 24 Many of
these initiatives also engage private actors in the regulatory process.
Thus, even traditional international regulatory modalities have
begun to take new forms.
The second striking feature is the voluntary rather than statemandated nature of the new regulatory norms. 25 It is natural for
private institutions formed by firms or NGOs to adopt voluntary
norms, as they lack the authority to promulgate binding law. But
even the new public-private arrangements and IGO initiatives such
as the UN Global 'Compact operate through "soft law" approaches
rather than the traditional "hard law" of treaties.
We refer to these novel private, public-private, and IGO
initiatives as forms of "regulatory standard-setting" (RSS), 26 defined

21.
In connection with the Governance Triangle, we use "NGOs" very broadly
to refer to all non-state actors except IGOs (Zone 1) and firms and industry groups that
are targets of regulation (Zone 2).
22.
Private schemes thus reflect a "cosmopolitan" view of global governance,
not limited to inter-state arrangements. See Kingsbury et al., supranote 16, at 43.
23.
Meidinger calls such arrangements "supragovernmental," because they are
established by private actors with governments playing only minor roles. Errol
Meidinger, Competitive SupragovernmentalRegulation: How Could It Be Democratic?,
8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 513, 516 (2008) [hereinafter Meidinger, Competitive
SupragovernmentalRegulation].
24.
The Draft Norms, supra note 5, were intended to apply directly to firms; the
failed UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations would also have done
SO.

25.
These norms are "voluntary" in the sense that they are not legally required;
however, firms often adhere because of pressure from NGOs, customer requirements,
industry association rules, and other forces that render them mandatory in practice.
26.
Other scholars characterize these developments solely in terms of their
private character. See, e.g., Bartley, supra note 2, at 297 ("transnational private
regulation"); CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 4 ("private governance systems" and
"non-state market driven governance systems"); PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, at ix (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999) (emphasizing private
authority as "governance without government"); Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J.
Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in the International System, in THE
EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Rodney Bruce Hall

& Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) (discussing the "legitimate authority" of private
organizations). We also address private institutions but argue that there is (and should
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as the promulgation and implementation of nonbinding, voluntary
standards of business conduct in situations that reflect "prisoner's
dilemma" externality incentives (the normal realm of regulation),
rather than coordination network externality incentives 27 (the realm
of voluntary technical "standards" such as those set by the
International Organization for Standardization). 28 RSS potentially
involves all of the functions of administrative regulation in domestic
legal systems: rule making, rule promotion and implementation,
monitoring, adjudication of compliance, and the imposition of
sanctions. 29 The rapid multiplication of RSS schemes is creating a
new kind of transnational regulatory system, one that demands a
broader view of regulation and a more nuanced view of the state as
30
regulator.
To gain analytical leverage on this complex emerging system, we
look to the New Governance model of regulation, which was

be) a role for the state in the emerging system. We therefore use the broader term RSS,
which encompasses more than purely "private" activity.
27.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, International "Standards" and
InternationalGovernance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 345, § 1 (2001) [hereinafter Abbott &
Snidal, International Standards] (distinguishing the broad categories of prisoner's
dilemma versus coordination externalities, and stating that a key difference between
the two is that incentives to participate in a regulatory scheme increase with the
number of other participants for coordination but not for prisoner's dilemma problems);
Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 392-94 (2005) (referring to these categories as "public
welfare" and "private transactional").
28.
Margaret M. Blair et al., The Roles of Standardization, Certification, and
Assurance Services in Global Commerce 15-17 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=ll20503 (arguing that regulatory standards, like
technical standards, reduce the transactions costs of market interactions). ISO is
currently considering guidelines for social responsibility standards, tentatively
designated ISO 26000.
29.
Cf. Kingsbury et al., supra note 16, at 17 (noting that functions of many
global institutions resemble domestic "administration"). On monitoring and related
activities, see Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental
Systems of Labor Standardsand Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1 (2003).
30.
Some definitions of "regulation" attempt to encompass such developments.
For example, Errol Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in
Emerging TransnationalRegulatory Systems, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN EMERGING
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 121, 121 (Christian Brutsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007)
[hereinafter Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia], defines "regulation" as "a purposive,
organized and sustained effort to establish a general and consistent order in a field of
human activity." It "typically centres on rules defined in terms of rights and duties,
with differentiated official roles and normative justifications ... characterized by a
reliance on credentialed experts." Id. Similarly, Julia Black, Enrolling Actors in
Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK FinancialServices Regulation, PUB. L., Spring
2003, at 63, 65, defines "regulation" as "the sustained and focused attempt to alter the
behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, and which may involve
mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification."
Even more broadly, Stepan Wood defines "regulation" as "all calculated efforts at social
control, whether undertaken by state agents or not." Wood, supranote 15, at 229.
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developed to characterize a diverse range of innovative domestic
regulatory practices. 31 The diversity of practices encompassed within
New Governance makes it difficult to define precisely-indeed, it is
32
often defined merely by contrast to traditional forms of regulation.
To focus the discussion, we identify four central elements of New

For discussions of New Governance from a public administration
31.
perspective, see THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE
(Lester M. Salamon ed., 2001). New Governance is related to other recent
developments in regulation. One is the growing use of nontraditional regulatory
instruments. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism:
Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 LAW & POL'Y 49 (1999); NEW
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU (Jonathan Golub ed., 1998)
[hereinafter NEW INSTRUMENTS]. In environmental regulation, for example, states
increasingly rely on economic instruments such as taxes and charges, deposit/refund
schemes, and tradable emissions permits. Even closer to New Governance are
instruments such as ecolabels and ecoaudits. Jonathan Golub, New Instruments for
Environmental Policy in the EU: Introduction and Overview, in NEW INSTRUMENTS,
supra, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Golub, Iitroduction]. These approaches are "a response to
the most influential critique of traditional regulation, which holds that it is needlessly
inefficient, costing more than is necessary to achieve a given level of social benefits."
Errol Meidinger, Forest Certification as Environmental Law-Making by Global Civil
Society, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF FOREST CERTIFICATION 293, 304
(Errol Meidinger et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Meidinger, Environmental LawMaking]. Market instruments can also lead to inefficiencies, e.g., if property rights are
inadequate. PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 12-14.
A second related development is New Public Management theory. See Mayra
2007,
May-June
ONLINE,
New Public Management, ACADEME
Besosa,
(defining "new
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2OO7/MJ/Featlbesol.htm
public management" theory as advocating the application of private-sector
management strategies to governance); see also DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 22-24 (1992) (arguing for government to be more "entrepreneurial" and
less bureaucratic in how it spends its resources); Scott Burris et al., Changes in
Governance:A Cross-DisciplinaryReview of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1,
46-47 (2008) (explaining the demand to "reinvent government" partially by making it
more efficient and responsive to constituents). New Public Management analogizes
regulators to businesses that must satisfy their "customers." Burris et al., supra, at 47.
Elements shared with New Governance include support for community "ownership" of
public programs; competition among service mechanisms including private contractors
and public-private partnerships; and a preference for participation over hierarchy.
OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra, at 49-107, 250-79.
Many practices seen as part of New Governance, such as government-business
negotiations over rules, have in fact been used for years; New Governance represents
an intensification of traditional approaches. See Wood, supra note 15, at 236.
Black, supra note 12, at 105; Grdinne de B(Irca & Joanne Scott,
32.
Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1, 2-3 (Grdinne de Bdrca & Joanne Scott eds.,
2006); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 542-43
(2007) [hereinafter Trubek & Trubek, New Governance].
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Governance, each reflecting a modification of the state's traditional
role. 33 In New Governance, the state:
(1) incorporates a decentralized range of actors and institutions,
both public and private, into the regulatory system, as by
negotiating standards with firms, encouraging and supervising
self-regulation, or sponsoring voluntary management systems;
(2) relies on this range of actors for regulatory expertise;
(3) modifies its regulatory responsibilities to emphasize
3 4 of public and private actors and institutions
orchestration
rather than direct promulgation and enforcement of rules; and
(4) utilizes "soft law" to complement or substitute for mandatory
"hard law."
The New Governance model is still predominantly applied in
New Governance approaches such as
domestic contexts.
government-industry pollution control agreements have been widely
adopted in industrialized countries. John Braithwaite argues that
New Governance may be even more valuable for developing countries
that lack essential capacities for traditional regulation. 35 To date,
however, neither scholars nor public officials have fully recognized
the potential of New Governance for the international system-what
we label "Transnational New Governance." New Governance cannot
be uncritically transferred to the very different circumstances
involved in the international system, where the role of the state is
even more attenuated, but it does provide key insights for improving
international regulation.
In this Article, we develop a model of Transnational New
Governance to analyze the emerging patterns of RSS and its potential
for improving international regulation. The Article advances both
positive and normative arguments. Positively, the Article argues that
the expanding array of RSS schemes is developing into a system of
As in the New
Transnational New Governance for business.
Governance model, these schemes form a decentralized but
increasingly dense and interlinked3 6 constellation of private and

For an alternative organization of the principles of New Governance, see
33.
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (synthesizing the literature
on New Governance and related approaches to regulation, identifying eight "organizing
principles").
The authors draw the term "orchestration" from Lobel. Id. at 345.
34.
35.
John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34
WORLD DEV. 884, 884-85 (2006). New Governance is undermined in developing
countries by weak markets and civil society, but Braithwaite still finds it more
workable than Old Governance. Id. at 886.
On emerging linkages among schemes, see Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia,
36.
supra note 30, at 126-30.
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public-private rule-making arrangements, drawing on many sources
of expertise and relying on soft law, which surrounds and
This
complements traditional state-based regulatory structures.
Article also argues positively that states, and especially IGOs, have
incentives to promote Transnational New Governance as the best
means of achieving their regulatory objectives. Normatively, this
Article argues that states and IGOs should promote Transnational
New Governance because it has significant potential to ameliorate
the persistent regulatory inadequacies of international "Old
37
Governance," which created the space for RSS to develop.
Whether Transnational New Governance can fulfill its potential,
however, depends upon the willingness and ability of states and IGOs
to provide the necessary orchestration and support. In theory and in
domestic contexts, New Governance is a tool deployed and
orchestrated by governments. 38 Orchestration includes a wide range
of directive and facilitative measures designed to convene, empower,
support, and steer public and private actors engaged in regulatory
activities. Most transnational RSS schemes, in contrast, have been
created from the bottom up by societal actors, 39 often in response to
perceived failures of state action. 40 Most are private institutions
operating largely free of state orchestration and support.41 Absent a
global "state" or more effective orchestration by states and IGOs, RSS
schemes must compete for authority 42 from target firms 43 and from

37.
The weakness of the state is frequently seen as a major reason for the rise
of domestic New Governance. Griinne de Bdrca & Joanne Scott, Narrowing the Gap?
Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union: Introduction, 13
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 513, 513-14 (2007).
38.
See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (1992) (holding public regulators should

"promote private market governance through enlightened delegations of regulatory
functions"); CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 29 (discussing how private regulation
literature focuses on institutions selected and empowered by state); Gunningham &
Sinclair, supra note 31, at 49-50 (viewing regulatory instruments as tools for policy
makers).
39.
Black, supra note 30, at 63-66 (analyzing modern regulation as a process of
"enrolling" those actors best able to contribute to the regulatory project, yet recognizing
that the state cannot control the enrolling process in a decentralized regulatory
system).
40.
Some state actions have encouraged RSS. Most significantly, WTO rules
have been seen as limiting the ability of governments to impose standards on foreign
production processes, as opposed to characteristics of imported goods; this has provided
an incentive for the creation of private standards, less constrained by WTO rules.
Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Racing to the Bottom?: Trade, Environmental
Governance, and ISO 14001, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 350, 359 (2006).
41.
No scheme is entirely private, as its participants and the institution itself
are legal entities operating under state-generated legal constraints.
42.
On the importance of obtaining authority from audiences connected to
relevant supply chains, see Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Non-State Global
Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest
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audiences including consumers, NGOs, "downstream" firms, and
socially responsible investors, 44 which can create incentives for firms
to comply with RSS norms. These processes are weaker and more
uncertain than state action. As a result, existing Transnational New
Governance falls short of the New Governance ideal-Transnational
New Governance is not and may never be as effective as New
Governance is within advanced states.
However, states and IGOs can play substantial, if nontraditional,
roles in Transnational New Governance to enhance its effectiveness. 4 5
This Article argues that states and IGOs can (positively) and should
(normatively) more actively support and steer RSS schemes,
embracing them as valuable components of the international
regulatory system. States and IGOs can draw on fewer and less
powerful techniques of orchestration than are available domestically,
but relatively modest actions can significantly enhance the
effectiveness, legitimacy, and global public interest orientation of
RSS. Nonetheless, our expectations must remain modest. The
political weaknesses that undercut international Old Governance also
constrain Transnational New Governance, and their extent is
massive: in many areas Transnational New Governance can do no
more than ameliorate the shortcomings of international regulation.
The Article proceeds as follows.
Part II introduces the
Governance Triangle, a heuristic device that depicts the multiplicity
and diversity of RSS schemes in terms of participation by three main
actor groups: States, Firms, and NGOs. This array of RSS schemes
constitutes the emerging system of Transnational New Governance
and is the empirical basis for our analysis. Part III develops basic
analytic building blocks, contrasting the "ideal type" of New
Governance to that of Old Governance. Unlike Old Governance, New
Governance emphasizes state orchestration of decentralized actors,

Convention?, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 33, 36.

43.
PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 2-3 (characterizing RSS schemes as
"clubs" of participating firms that provide members with private benefits-primarily
superior reputations and public goodwill-and simultaneously provide NGOs,
consumers and other audiences a low-cost way to identify "good" firms).
44.
As discussed further below, business and nonbusiness 'legitimacy
communities" have quite different criteria for granting authority, such that a gain of
legitimacy with one may reduce the authority granted by another. Black, supra note
30, at 75-76.
45.
CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 28, tbl.1.7, presents a useful typology of
governance modes, placing most private RSS schemes in the "non-state market driven"
category, in which authority is derived from market audiences. In terms of this
typology, we argue for greater support and involvement by states and IGOs; that would
move such schemes out of the pure "non-state" category and toward Cashore, Auld and
Newsom's next category, "shared public-private governance." However, they define this
category to include only schemes whose authority is derived from government; we
would not move private schemes that far.
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engages dispersed expertise, and relies on soft law. Part IV analyzes
how these two ideal types have been transferred imperfectly to the
international level: Old Governance through IGOs and unilateral
state actions, and New Governance through the RSS schemes on the
Triangle. Transnational New Governance is even more decentralized
and suffers a severe "orchestration deficit" compared to the New
Part V evaluates the strengths and
Governance ideal type.
weaknesses of Transnational New Governance in light of this
Part VI analyzes how the orchestration deficit that
analysis.
weakens Transnational New Governance might be overcome,
particularly through facilitative orchestration, a more practical option
than the directive orchestration characteristic of domestic New
Governance.

II. THE GOVERNANCE TRIANGLE
We begin by introducing the major transnational RSS schemes
that constitute the emerging Transnational New Governance system.
We present these diverse institutions systematically through the
Governance Triangle in Figure 1; the schemes shown on the Triangle
are identified in Table 1, with the dates of their first significant
regulatory standard-setting activities. Points on the Triangle locate
individual RSS schemes according to their most salient and
innovative feature: the relative "shares" that Firms, NGOs, and
States exercise in scheme governance. 46 (For clarity, in Zones 2 and 6
brackets indicate sets of schemes that are sufficiently similar to be
approximated by a single point.) These three actor groups-the
potential participants in regulatory governance-also define the
its surface thus represents the potential
Triangle as a whole;
"regulatory space. '47 For convenience, that space is divided into

The more important the role an actor plays, the closer a scheme is placed to
46.
that actor's vertex. For a detailed description of the Triangle and its placement criteria,
see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL
[hereinafter Abbott & Snidal, Governance Triangle].
REGULATION, supra note 4
Placement of schemes is a summary representation of complex arrangements and
should be viewed as only approximate, because of measurement issues and, more
importantly, because actor groups typically play different roles in different aspects of a
scheme's operations and at different points in its development. Cf. CASHORE ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 220 (advocating comparison by process rather than placement). For a
similar conceptualization of the universe of voluntary environmental codes-presented
as a social space defined by three partially overlapping fields representing "polluters,"
"public authorities" and "third parties"-see Wood, supra note 15, at 237. We include
some OG schemes in Zone 1 for purposes of the ensuing discussion.
This resembles the "global administrative space" identified in Kingsbury et
47.
al., supra note 16, at 25-27.
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seven zones representing situations in which one (Zones 1-3), two
(Zones 4-6), or three (Zone 7) actor groups dominate governance of
RSS schemes.
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Figure 1: The Governance Triangle
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Zone
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IECA
OECD

The Employment of Children Act (India), 1938
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976

ECO

German Blue Angel eco-label, 1978

BM

WHO Code of Marketing for Breast-milk
Substitutes, 1981

EMAS

UK Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, 1992

IFC

International Finance Corp. Safeguard Policies, 1998

GAP
BS

Labor rights scheme of Gap, Inc., 1992
The Body Shop, "Trade Not Aid" initiative, 1991

ICC

Int'l Chamber of Commerce Business Charter for
Sustainable Development, 1991

RC

Responsible Care, 1987

GG

Global GAP, agricultural products standard on
safety, environment, labor, 1997 (as EUREPGAP)
SQF 1000, 2000 food safety standards, optional
social, environmental standards, 1994

SQF

Zone

[VOL. 42:501

WDC

World Diamond Council warranty system for
conflict diamonds, 2004

ICMM

Int'l Council on Mining and Metals sustainable
development principles, 2003

WRAP

Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production,
industry labor code, 2000

SFI

Sustainable Forestry Initiative, 1994

PEFC

Programme for the Endorsement of Forest
Certification, 1999 (as Pan-European Forest
Certification)

WBC

World Business Council for Sustainable
Development, 1992

BSC

Business Social Compliance Initiative; European
supplier labor standard, 2004

SULL
Al

Sullivan Principles, 1977
Amnesty International Human Rights Guidelines
for Companies, 1997
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Zone
4

Zone
5

Zone
6

CCC

Clean Clothes Campaign Code of Labor Practices
for apparel, 1998

CERES

CERES Principles on environmental practices, 1989

RUG

Rugmark labeling scheme to control child labor in
carpets, 1994

GSULL

Global Sullivan Principles on economic and social
justice, 1999

WRC

Worker Rights Consortium, 2000

RA

Rainforest Alliance/Sustainable Agriculture
Network standard, 1993

ISO14

International Organization for Standardization
14001 environmental management standard, 1996

UNGC

United Nations Global Compact, 2000

TOI

Tour Operators Initiative, 2000

EQP

Equator Principles, 2003

TCO

TCO Development environmental and energy
standards for computers, 1992

PRI

Principles for Responsible Investment,
UN institutional investor scheme, 2006

IFOAM

International Federation of Organic Agriculture
Movements, 1972

FLA

Fair Labor Association; apparel industry scheme, 1999

FLO

Fairtrade Labeling Organization, "fair trade"
umbrella scheme, 1997

FTO

World Fair Trade Organization; standard for fair
trade organizations, 2004

FSC

Forest Stewardship Council certification, labeling
scheme, 1993

GRI

Global Reporting Initiative standards for social,
environmental reports, 1997

SAI

Social Accountability Int'l standard for supplier
labor practices, 1997

ETI

Ethical Trading Initiative, worker rights scheme, 1998

MAC

Marine Aquarium Council standards for
ornamental fish suppliers, 2001
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MH

Max Havelaar, Netherlands, Fair Trade coffee
certification, labeling scheme, 1988

MSC

Marine Stewardship Council, 1997

AA

AccountAbility AA1000 framework for ethical
business practices, 1999

4C

Common Code for the Coffee Community, social,
environmental standard, 2006

AIP

Apparel Industry Partnership; Clinton
Administration stakeholders scheme, 1996-97

EITI

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative;
UK financial disclosure scheme, 2002-03

ILO

International Labor Org. Declaration on
Multinational Enterprises, 1977

KIMB

Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds, 2003

VPSHR

Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
(private security), 2000

Table 1. RSS Schemes on the Governance Triangle
The three actor groups should be understood as general, abstract
categories. In particular, the very broad "NGO" category covers all
private actors except the firms that are the targets of regulation; it
thus includes not only NGO advocacy groups, but also labor unions,
nonprofits, student groups, and other civil society organizations, as
well as socially responsible investors, which might be considered
"firms" in other contexts. The other two categories also contain
significant variations. The "Firms" category includes multinationals
selling branded consumer products, small firms selling intermediate
goods, agricultural enterprises and small-scale farmers, and many
other variants. "States" includes both developing and developed
countries, as well as governmental agencies.
Each group also
includes both individual and collective actors, such as firms and
industry associations or states and IGOs, which may have distinct
characteristics.
Differences like these are crucial in addressing
particular issues, but setting them aside provides a clearer depiction
of the emerging Transnational New Governance system as a whole.
A tour around the Governance Triangle reveals both the
multiplicity and range of RSS schemes. We begin with the singleactor institutions at the vertices of the Triangle. Zone 1 is dense with
traditional national laws and regulations on labor, the environment
and human rights; these are forms of domestic Old Governance,
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although their enforcement varies widely. We represent them by one
early example from a developing country, the Indian Employment of
Children Act of 1938 (IECA++), 48 with '++' indicating the many other
national enactments that could be included. Zone 1 also includes
many voluntary state programs reflecting New Governance. We
represent these by the pioneering German "Blue Angel" eco-label
(ECO++) (1978) and the British Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
(EMAS++) (1992), with '++' again indicating the many other domestic
New Governance initiatives that have been adopted. 49 Note the
absence in Zone 1 of treaties and other traditional forms of
international regulation; these address firm behavior only indirectly,
by mandating or coordinating national regulation, whereas we define
the Triangle to include only schemes that regulate firms directly.
Zone 1 does include a few IGO schemes that meet this criterion, such
as the OECD Guidelines.
Zone 2 has recently become dense with hundreds if not
thousands of firm schemes. 50 Two early initiatives, by The Body Shop
(BS++, 1991) and Gap, Inc. (GAP++, 1992), represent the subsequent
cascade of firm self-regulation. The chemical industry's Responsible
Care program (RC, 1987), a response to Bhopal, is an early industrywide self-regulatory scheme.5 1 Other Zone 2 schemes, such as Global
Gap (GG), are efforts by retailers and other resellers to regulate the
practices of transnational suppliers. 52
Zone 3 contains a smaller
number of NGO schemes, including the pioneering Sullivan
Principles (1977), the CERES Principles (1989), and Rugmark (1994).
The remaining zones include RSS schemes governed jointly by
two or more types of actors. The most intriguing of these is Zone 6,
which includes schemes that are joint efforts between NGOs and
firms. Examples include the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC),

48.
Summary information on national labor legislation is available in the ILO
NATLEX database. International Labour Organization, NATLEX, http://www.ilo.org/
dynlnatlex/natlex browse.home (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). For information on the
IECA (which was superseded by other legislation in 1986), see International Labour
Organizations, NATLEX: Browse By Country Results, http://www.ilo.org/dyrnatlex/
natlex-browse.details?plang=en&pcountry=IND&pclassification=04&p-origin=COU
NTRY&p-sortby=SORTBYCOUNTRY (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
49.
Wood, supra note 15, at 236-48, documents the large number of such
arrangements.
50.
These typically include a code of conduct and more or less extensive
procedures for implementation and monitoring; they may be linked to broader
corporate structures for addressing business ethics and stakeholder concerns. See
Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 452, 466-68 (2008).

51.
Responsible
Care, Who We Are, http://www.responsiblecare.org/
page.asp?p=6406&l-1 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
52.
Global Gap, http://www.globalgap.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); see also
Tetty Havinga, Private Regulation of Food Safety by Supermarkets, 28 LAW & POLY
515 (2006) (suggesting that grocery retailers responding to consumer preferences for
food safety and quality may set more stringent standards than public regulators).
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which promotes sustainable forestry; the Fairtrade Labeling
Organization (FLO), an umbrella for national fair trade programs;
Social Accountability International (SAI), which promotes worker
rights principles and management systems; and the Fair Labor
Association (FLA), which promotes worker rights in transnational
apparel production. While many of these schemes entail some
indirect state role (e.g., the use of state-created standards), a few
involve more substantial state participation. For example, the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) is located relatively high in Zone 6 to
reflect its relationship with the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), which originally partnered with CERES to
develop GRI; GRI is now a UNEP "collaborating center. '5 3 Zone 6 has
arguably been the most vibrant area of RSS in recent years.
By contrast, Zones 4 and 5, which contain hybrid public-private
arrangements, are relatively unpopulated. Zone 4 contains the UN
Global Compact (UNGC); the Equator Principles (EQP), a banking
initiative encouraged by the International Finance Corporation and
based on IFC environmental and social standards; 54 and the ISO
14001 environmental management standard. Zone 5 is virtually
empty; our only examples are the specialized TCO Development and
the recent UN-sponsored Principles for Responsible Investment, in
which pension funds and other fiduciary investors act as NGOs.
Finally, Zone 7 schemes share governance among all three groups of
actors. Examples include the International Labour Organization's
Declaration on Multinational Enterprises (ILO), where the tripartite
structure of the ILO engages labor and business, and the Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR), drafted by
national governments, energy firms, and human rights NGOs.
The Governance Triangle in Figure 1 does not show every
transnational RSS scheme. Moreover, even if the Triangle were a
complete mapping, it would require frequent revision; new schemesaddressing issues such as fresh water stewardship,5 5 sustainable
biofuels production, 56 and sustainable tourism 5 7-are regularly being

53.
See
Global
Reporting
Initiative,
Our
History,
http://www.
globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhatWeDo/OurHistory (last visited Feb. 16, 2009);
United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP Offices, http://www.unep.org/
Documents.MultilinguallDefault.asp?DocumentID=296 (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).

54.
See Andrew Hardenbrook, The Equator Principles: The Private Financial
Sector's Attempt at Environmental Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 197, 20001 (2007).
55.
The Alliance for Water Stewardship is developing global standards for
socially beneficial and sustainable management of freshwater resources. See Alliance
for Water Stewardship, http://www.allianceforwaterstewardship.org/index.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2009).
56.
The Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels is developing global standards for
sustainable biofuels production and processing. See CEN-Energy Center, Roundtable
on Sustainable Biofuels, http://cgse.epfl.chpage65660-en.html (last visited Feb. 16,
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created. Yet Figure 1 clearly reveals the multiplicity and diversity of
RSS schemes. 58
Some issues, such as child labor in apparel
production, are addressed by schemes in multiple zones: OECD and
IECA++ in Zone 1; GAP++, WRAP, and BSC in Zone 2; WRC and
CCC in Zone 3; FLA, SAI, and GRI in Zone 6; and ILO in Zone 7. The
density of zones varies widely: Zones 1 and 2 are especially dense;
Zones 3 and 6 are moderately dense; and Zones 4, 5, and 7 are
relatively sparse.
RSS is evolving toward a system of Transnational New
Governance. Prior to 1985, labor, environmental, and human rights
regulation was almost exclusively the province of states and IGOs in
Zone 1; mandatory law predominated, along with a growing number
of domestic New Governance initiatives and a few IGO programs with
59
New Governance elements, such as the 1976 OECD Guidelines.
NGO efforts to address domestic and international regulatory gaps
led to the proliferation of Zone 3 schemes beginning in the mid-1980s,
about the same time as the firm and industry codes in Zone 2.60 The
latter rapidly accelerated until, by the late 1990s, it had become de
rigueur for large, multinational firms to adopt codes of conduct on
social and environmental issues. 61 The last fifteen years have seen
the emergence
of multi-actor
schemes-initially firm-NGO
collaborations, then more recently a few truly trilateral schemes.
Thus, in addition to the generally increasing number of RSS schemes,
one can observe a progression, first among different types of singleactor schemes, then into increasingly complex multi-actor schemes.
This evolving pattern constitutes the emerging Transnational New
62
Governance system represented by the Triangle as a whole.

2009). Similar Roundtables already address specific crops. See, e.g., Roundtable on
Sustainable Palm Oil, http://www.rspo.org/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
57.
The Rainforest Alliance is developing the Sustainable Tourism Stewardship
Council as a "global accreditation body for sustainable tourism and ecotourism
certification programs." See Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Tourism, Sustainable
Tourism Stewardship Council, http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/tourism.cfm?id=
council (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). The Alliance (RA in Zone 3) also certifies tropical
agricultural products including coffee, cocoa and flowers against standards set by the
Sustainable Agriculture Network. See Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Agriculture,
Standards,
http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/agriculture.cfm?id=standards
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2009).
58.
For a related discussion of our Governance Triangle, see Abbott & Snidal,
Governance Triangle, supra note 46, at 7-9.
59.
See id. at 10-11 (describing the lack of RSS before 1985).
60.
Id. at 8-9, 11 (describing emergence of NGO and Firm schemes).
61.
Id.; see also Lance Compa, Trade Unions, NGOs, and Corporate Codes of
Conduct, http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/codesofconduct/compa.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2009) (describing the proliferation of corporate codes of conduct in the 1990s).
62.
See generally Abbott & Snidal, Governance Triangle, supra note 46 (tracing
the evolution of RSS in more detail and analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of
single- and multi-actor schemes based on the "competencies" of participating actors).
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GOVERNANCE AND NEW GOVERNANCE

This Part begins by systematizing New Governance and its
analytical opposite, traditional regulation (Old Governance), as ideal
types. This Part also presents the major arguments in favor of New
Governance and highlights the limitations of both ideal types.

A. Old Governance and New Governance as Ideal Types
Table 2 compares the four principal features of the two ideal
types. These depictions are analytic caricatures designed to highlight
the key properties of the two visions of regulation and the differences
between them. Although actual schemes vary, these ideal analytic
properties are useful guides to the key differences between the two
approaches. 63 We discuss each feature in turn in this Part.
Old Governance

New Governance

State-centric

State orchestration

Centralized

Decentralized

Bureaucratic expertise

Dispersed expertise

Mandatory rules

Soft law

Table 2: Old Governance and New Governance as ideal types
B. Role of the State
Old Governance and New Governance are fundamentally
distinguished by the differing roles of the state in regulation; other
features largely flow from this distinction. In Old Governance, the
state is central. While actual regulatory systems are more complex,
in ideal Old Governance the state regulates from the top down, often
exercises "command and control" over regulated activities, and
coercively enforces its rules when necessary. 64 The central role of the
state and state coercion are justified by the incentives firms and other
targets of regulation face in prisoner's dilemma externality
situations. 65 Standard examples in U.S. law include environmental

63.
Black, supra note 12, at 105, correctly calls the ideal type of traditional
command and control regulation a "caricature"-but that's the point!
64.
David M. Trubek & Louise B. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the
Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination, 11 EUR.
L.J. 343, 344 (2005) [hereinafter Trubek & Trubek, Open Method of Coordination];
Trubek & Trubek, New Governance, supra note 32, at 543.
65.
PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supranote 7, at 1.
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regulations that limit certain forms of pollution or prescribe certain
pollution control technologies, and laws mandating specific labor
relations procedures.66 EU regulation of member-state activities
through the "Community Method" of rule making-based on
Commission initiative, legislative action by the Council and European
Parliament, and uniform interpretation by the Court of Justice-is
also a variety of Old Governance. 67 Through the Community Method,
the EU aspires to the Old Governance ideal for IGOs to operate as
central "governments," perhaps in federal style vis-h-vis participating
states. However, in this the EU is an exception among IGOs, most of
which have had little success with centralized Old Governance.
In New Governance, the state remains a significant player, but
as an orchestrator rather than a top-down commander. The state
pursues public goals by promoting and empowering a network of
public, private-sector, and civil society actors and institutions, all of
which are encouraged to engage in various "regulatory" (including
self-regulatory) activities.
State "orchestration" includes a wide
range of directive and facilitative techniques for supporting and
steering this network, such as initiating voluntary and cooperative
programs; convening and facilitating private collaborations;
persuading and providing incentives for firms to self-regulate;
building the capacities of private actors; negotiating regulatory
targets with firms; providing incentives to exceed mandated
performance levels; and ratifying or scaling up successful
68
approaches.
A domestic U.S. example is the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) National Environmental Performance Track,
launched in 2000, which offers public recognition, fewer inspections,

66.
Golub, Introduction, supra note 31, at 2, presents early European
environmental regulation as another paradigm case of Old Governance: "The command
and control approach is characterised by direct regulation: the government prescribes
uniform environmental standards across large regions, mandates . . . abatement
methods .... licenses production sites which adopt the required methods, and assures
compliance through monitoring and sanctions."
67.

[The Community Method] is mainly associated with binding legislative
and executive acts .... the imposition of more or less uniform rules for
all Member States, and the role of courts ....
The Community
Method. . . [is built on] hierarchy in terms of generally binding
provisions, hierarchy of norms, and public control on their respect.

Stijn Smismans, New Modes of Governance and the ParticipatoryMyth 4 (European
Governance Papers, Working Paper No. N-06-01, 2006).
68.
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1, 31-33 (1997-98) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative Governance];
Lobel, supra note 33, at 320-24. For a valuable typology of interactions between the
state and private rule making bodies, see Stepan Wood, Environmental Management
Systems and Public Authority in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance, 10
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 131 (2002-03).
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less frequent reporting, accelerated permit review, and less stringent
substantive rules 69 for firms that voluntarily commit to enhanced
environmental performance and continuous improvement, adopt
internal environmental management systems (EMS) subject to
external auditing, and engage with the public.70 A parallel EU
procedure is the Environmental Management and Audit System
(EMAS), 7 1 under which the EU certifies companies and other
organizations that voluntarily make environmental commitments,
adopt qualified EMS, carry out environmental reviews and audits,
and publicly report their environmental performance. 72 To promote
global harmonization, EMAS recognizes EMS standards established
by ISO 14001 as appropriate intermediate steps. 73 Similarly, the EU
has created a procedure for coordinating social regulation among its
member states, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which relies
on common objectives, national implementation plans, common
indicators, national reporting, exchange of good practices, and joint

Environmental
Protection
Agency,
National
69.
See Environmental
Performance Track, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/about.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2009); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE TRACK, PERFORMANCE TRACK REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND
OTHER MEMBER BENEFITS 1-3 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/downloads/
PTRegulAdminIncentives.pdf.
National
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
70.
See Environmental
Performance Track, Criteria, http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/program/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2009). For other examples of domestic New Governance techniques, see
Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in
Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 707 (2003) (Exec.
Order No. 12,866, U.S. EPA, Federal Highway Admin., Nuclear Regulatory
Commission programs); Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 68, at 41-47
(EPA and OSHA negotiated rule-makings); Katharina Holzinger et al., Rhetoric or
Reality? "New Governance" in EU Environmental Policy, 12 EUR. L.J. 403, 409, 420
(2006) (EU environmental policy); Miriam Seifter, Rent-a-Regulator: Design and
Innovation in Privatized Governmental Decisionmaking, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1091, 1093
n.7 (2006) (EU environmental policy); Trubek & Trubek, New Governance, supra note
32, at 543, 558 (Wisconsin Green Tier program).
71.
The EU adopted EMAS to reduce confusion caused by multiple member
state EMS programs, such as the UK EMAS in Zone 1.
72.
Europa, Environment, European Eco-Management Audit Scheme,
Summary, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/about/summary-en.htm (last visited
Feb. 16, 2009); see also FRANCESCO PERRINI ET AL., DEVELOPING CORPORATE SOCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 106-08 (2006); Karola Taschner,
Environmental Management Systems: The European Regulation, in NEW
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 31, at 215, 216-17.
73.
See EMAS and ISO/EN ISO 14001: Differences and Complementarities,
EMAS-Factsheet (Eco-Mgmt. & Audit Scheme, European Commission), May 2008,
available at http://ec.europa.eulenvironment/emas/pdf/factsheet/fs iso-en-low.pdf. For
a comparison of EU EMAS and ISO 14001, see Kelly Kollman & Aseem Prakash, Green
by Choice?: Cross-National Variations in Firms' Responses to EMS-Based
EnvironmentalRegimes, 53 WORLD POL. 399, 411-16 (2001).
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analysis and assessment of progress and priorities. 74 As these
examples suggest, the state often initiates New Governance
programs. While firms and other private actors may create their own
schemes or approach the state with proposals for collaborative
regulation, ideally the state treats New Governance as an important
regulatory tool and uses it proactively.
Even though the state eschews most mandatory actions in a New
Governance system, it retains its regulatory authority and can use it
in significant ways. It can establish accountability mechanisms for
private actors and institutions, such as the Performance Track
requirement for independent external assessment; 75 require them to
abide by procedural and substantive norms applicable to public law,
such as due process; and set minimum standards, default rules, and
other substantive parameters. Additionally, state power often lurks
in the background.
If necessary, the state can step in with
mandatory regulation, and the threat of such intervention reinforces
softer New Governance measures.76

74.
European
Commission,
Employment,
Social Affairs,
& Equal
Opportunities, Social Protection Social Inclusion, The Process: The Open Method of
Coordination,
http://ec.europa.eu/employment-social/spsi/the-process-en.htm
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2009); Communication from the Commission, Working Together,
Working Better: A New Framework for the Open Coordination of Social Protection and
Inclusion Policies in the European Union, COM (2005) 706 final (Dec. 22, 2005)
(reviewing progress under OMC and proposing changes to strengthen and streamline
process). On the OMC, see generally Kerstin Jacobsson, Between Deliberation and
Discipline: Soft Governance in EU Employment Policy, in SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE
AND REGULATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS

81 (Ulrika

Morth ed., 2004);

Trubek & Trubek, Open Method of Coordination,supra note 64, at 343. The OMC grew
out of earlier procedures to coordinate member state economic and employment
policies, extended to implement the 2000 "Lisbon strategy" for economic and social
reform. Kenneth Armstrong & Claire Kilpatrick, Law, Governance or New Governance?
The Changing Open Method of Coordination,13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 649, 650 (2007). In
some fields, OMC encourages civil society participation, although Smismans, supra
note 67, at 18, casts doubt on the extent of civil society involvement. Armstrong &
Kilpatrick, supra, criticize the association of the Community Method and OMC with
Old Governance and New Governance, and with hard and soft law, respectively. For
other examples of EU New Governance in relations with member states, see Trubek &
Trubek, New Governance, supra note 32, at 550-57 (discussing the Water Framework
Directive, Stability and Growth Pact).
75.
Such measures must adapt public law mechanisms to the private context.
Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization,116 HARv. L. REV.
1285, 1325-26 (2003) [hereinafter Freeman, Privatization], recommends measures
such as private accreditation, auditing, ombudsmen, disclosure, and management
systems.
76.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 158 (arguing that delegations of
regulatory authority are "reinforced by traditional forms of regulatory fiat-if
delegation fails"); Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 68, at 32; Lobel,
supra note 33, at 372. Many scholars favor hybrids of Old Governance and New
Governance, in which the state maintains a baseline of mandatory rights and
procedures, adopts default rules for actors that do not engage in New Governance
standard-setting, or uses New Governance techniques to implement mandatory law. de
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C. Centralizationvs. Decentralization
Old Governance is hierarchical, with regulatory authority
centralized in state organs, typically executive departments and
administrative agencies. Old Governance views societal actors as
self-interested and unaccountable, and thus incapable of selfregulation or any direct role in state regulation. 7 7 To further the
public interest, the state must restrict authority to public regulators
presumed to be independent, disinterested, and public-spirited. 78 To
preserve regulators' independence, regulatory procedures largely
insulate them from the influence of private actors. 79 Private groups
may compete to influence regulatory decisions, but only at arm's
length through carefully designed procedures.8 0 The potential agency
costs of delegating broad authority to independent regulators are
constrained by administrative procedures and the formal and
informal mechanisms of representative democracy. Once decisions
are made, private actors become objects of regulation.
In New Governance, regulatory authority is decentralized, with
regulatory responsibilities shared among private actors as well as
state agencies.8 1 Firms are encouraged to regulate themselves, 8 2 and
civil society actors are encouraged to participate in regulating others
through varied forms of private ordering and relationships with state

Bdrca & Scott, supra note 32, at 514-15; Trubek & Trubek, New Governance, supra
note 32, at 541-42.
See Braithwaite, supra note 35, at 886-87, for an explanation of the Old
77.
Governance view on societal actors.
78.
Freeman, Privatization, supra note 75, at 1303; Freeman, Collaborative
Governance, supra note 68, at 13.
79.
This is not typically true of legislatures, but U.S. scholars in particular
view it as characteristic of independent administrative agencies. See, e.g., Guy L.F.
Holburn & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, Consumer Capture of Regulatory Institutions:

The Creation of Public Utility Consumer Advocates in the United States, 126 PUBLIC
CHOICE 45, 45-47 (2006), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/
m1451nr726024041/fulltext.pdf.
Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 68, at 10-12, 18-19. The
80.
processes by which societal actors influence decisions (e.g., comments on proposed
regulations) nevertheless provide important information to state regulators and help
legitimize agency decision making.
81.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 4 ("[Plublic policy can
effectively delegate government regulation . . . to public interest groups . . . , to
unregulated competitors ....and even to the regulated firms themselves."); cf. Archon
Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Thinking About Empowered ParticipatoryGovernance, in
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY
GOVERNANCE 3, 3-4 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003) (proposing expanded

forms of participatory governance).
See Black, supra note 12, at 113-21 (reviewing multiple definitions of "self82.
regulation").
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agencies.83 Decentralized regulation draws on the often greater
resources and capacities of private actors-for example, inspections of
suppliers may be more effective when performed by knowledgeable
firms or NGOs than by public inspectors.8 4 Decentralization thus
reduces demands on the state, a significant advantage in an era when
many states and agencies face both shrinking resources and growing
demands for action.8 5 However, decentralization is not a retreat by
the state from its public responsibilities, but rather a means of
enlisting private actors as partners in pursuit of public goals.8 6 In
particular, state orchestration can extend public law principles, such
87
as due process, into the regulatory activities of private institutions.
With authority decentralized, New Governance becomes
collaborative or "networked," with the state coordinating and
engaging with business and civil society groups throughout the
regulatory process. 88 The state helps create and acts within a web of
relationships 8 9 -convening, facilitating, legitimating, negotiating,
publicizing, ratifying, supervising, partnering, and otherwise
interacting with private actors for regulatory purposesY0 The state
thus views firms and NGOs as partners in governance, not mere

83.
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 292-314 (1998) (arguing that Old
Governance in the twentieth century was shaped by the centralized, hierarchical
nature of target firms). Now that firms are more open, networked and collaborative,
New Governance approaches are more appropriate. Id. In the approach Dorf and Sabel
recommend, "directly deliberative polyarchy," "citizens [in sub-national locales]
participate directly in determining and assessing the utility of the services...
government provides." Id. at 288.
84.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 104-06.
CASHORE, ET AL., supra note 17, at 10; O'Rourke, supranote 29, at 4.
85.
86.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 103 (suggesting that
government subcontract regulatory functions to private actors for greater efficiency).
Freeman, Privatization,supra note 75, at 1285, 1290, 1314-15, 1327-28.
87.
Adelle Blackett, Codes of Corporate Conduct and the Labour Regulatory
88.
State, in HARD CHOICES, SoFr LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 121, 129 (noting that labor
law has long involved tripartite collaboration, and arguing that New Governance
approaches to worker rights must preserve democratic participation); Lobel, supra note
33, at 344; see Black, supra note 12 , at 111 (describing characteristics of the new
regulatory state'); Braithwaite, supra note 35, at 889-90 (discussing the era of
networked governance); de Biirca & Scott, supra note 32, at 3 (discussing key aspects of
new governance).
89.
In two significant forms of collaboration, the state is passive. First, many
private RSS schemes rely on, and gain authority from the use of, public norms, such as
those of the ILO. BENEDICTE BULL & DESMOND MCNEILL, DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND MARKET MULTILATERALISM
33 (2007); O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 4. Second, many schemes require compliance
with national law as a basic element of their standards. Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia,
supra note 30, at 130. Background property rights, contract, and tort rules are also
critically important to RSS. CASHORE, ETAL., supra note 17, at 20-21.
Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 68, at 31-32.
90.
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interest groups or objects of regulation.9 1 This softens the adversarial
92
nature of regulation, reducing its social costs.
Collaboration is more conducive than Old Governance procedures
to information sharing and learning, an important benefit given the
bounded rationality of state regulators. 93 New Governance allows the
state to work with regulatory targets and other actors to tailor
policies to their specific needs and local conditions, rather than
forcing uniform rules on disparate circumstances.
This creates
incentives for firms to exceed mandated standards, and reduces the
state's own costs of monitoring and enforcement. 94 More broadly,
state regulators, state-sponsored New Governance programs, and
private schemes observe one another, borrow techniques, compete,
95
and otherwise co-evolve over time.
Importantly, collaboration in New Governance is not just about
the state. Private actors and institutions also collaborate with one
another in multi- stakeholder arrangements. Collaboration allows
actors to pursue complementary goals and combine complementary
competencies. 9 6 For example, collaboration between NGOs that favor
high labor standards and firms that are willing to accept higher
standards but prefer self-regulation may result in a joint standard
that is more effectively implemented than a pure NGO scheme
(because of the firms' business expertise and management capacity)
and more legitimate than a pure industry code (because of the NGOs'
normative expertise, commitment, and independence).
Participation by diverse private and public actor combinations in
New Governance produces multiple regulatory approaches.
The
synergy provided by multiple actors pursuing similar goals through
varied means may be more effective than the actions of a single

91.
Lobel, supra note 33, at 377; see Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance, supra
note 68, at 13, 22 (arguing that Old Governance regulatory procedures are based on
interest group representation, whereas New Governance fosters meaningful
participation by private actors and joint responsibility for regulatory outcomes). Some
see such collaboration as part of a broader post-regulatory era of "networked
governance," in which private "gatekeepers" such as accounting firms, lawyers and
other professionals, financial rating agencies, NGOs, and other private actors are the
most effective "regulators." Braithwaite, supra note 35, at 889-90.
92.
PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 8-9.
93.
Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 68, at 22-23, 28-29.
94.
PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 73-74; see also Golub, supra note 31,
at 3-6 (contrasting the drawbacks of the old with the benefits of the new method).
95.
Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation, supra note 23, at
519-20.
96.
Abbott & Snidal, Governance Triangle, supra note 46; Black, supra note 30,
at 85. For similar reasons, New Public Management theory has led many states to
provide domestic "public" services through public-private partnerships, service
contracts, and similar arrangements. Historically, private actors provided many such
services. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 68, at 22; Freeman,
Privatization,supra note 75, at 1289.
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centralized
regulator.
Decentralization
also
promotes
experimentation.
Competition, demonstration effects, and other
interactions help the system as a whole to learn from the successes
and failures of regulatory experiments in a "permanent strategy for
innovation. '97 Ideally, competitive pressures and public support will
lead to the replication or scaling up of successful approaches. 98 Like
collaboration, multiplicity also facilitates the fine-tuning of regulation
to local circumstances. 99 Of course, multiplicity entails transactions
costs, but New Governance advocates see the benefits as outweighing
them in most cases.10 0
Finally, New Governance views broad participation not only as a
means to more effective regulation, but also as an end in itself.10 1 By
breaching the Old Governance divide between officials and interest
0 3
groups, 10 2 decentralization promotes stakeholder engagement,

97.
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 83, at 287-88, 315-16, 322-23 (arguing that to be
effective national regulation must adapt to local conditions); Freeman, Collaborative
Governance, supra note 68, at 22-23, 26, 28-29 (describing aspects of effective
collaborative governance); Lobel, supra note 33, at 380, 316-20 (arguing that the most
effective means of regulating is through competition and diversity); Martha Minow,
Public and Private Partnerships:Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARv. L. REV.
1229, 1243-46 (2003) (discussing the potential of competition and diversity to create
incentives for increased innovation and efficiency).
98.
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 83, at 335 (discussing the benefits of the parallel
development approach, in which parts of a system are developed simultaneously);
Lobel, supra note 33, at 452-53 (advocating the benefits of collaborative approaches
between government and private actors to encourage private actors to self-regulate);
Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke & Archon Fung, Ratcheting Labor Standards:
Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace 15-16 (World Bank
Social Protection, Discussion Paper No. 0011, 2000) (advocating a use of competition
between private parties to encourage improvement in labor practices).
99.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 101 (discussing a model that
would create negotiated regulations "particularized to each firm"); Dorf & Sabel, supra
note 83, at 315 ("[E]ffective government... regulations must be continuously
adapted... to respond to diverse and changing local conditions."); Lobel, supra note 33,
at 400 (arguing that decentralized regulation requires coordination of local efforts).
100.
Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation, supra note 23, at
521.
101.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 82 ("An opportunity for
participation by stakeholders in decisions over matters that affect their lives is a
democratic good independent of any improved outcomes that follow from it."); see also
Fung & Wright, supra note 81, at 27-29. In fact, some New Governance schemes lack
strong public participation. Smismans, supra note 67, at 5 ("[M]ore heterarchical,
horizontal and flexible modes of governance do not necessarily imply more
participation and inclusion . . . as too quickly taken for granted by some normative
claims.").
102.
Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 68, at 18, 27; see AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 57-58 (suggesting a policy of tripartism in which
public interest groups are granted access to all information available to regulators and
to all regulator-firm negotiations).
103.
Stakeholder engagement is a longtime goal of labor regulation, but
participation is generally limited to employers and unions. Blackett, supra note 88, at
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thereby providing new avenues for participation and voice, enriching
democracy, and enhancing the legitimacy of regulation.10 4 In this,
New Governance implicitly draws on the deliberative tradition of
democratic theory, which emphasizes participation, deliberation, and
individual rights, rather than representation and accountability, as in
the liberal tradition. 10 5 New Governance sees decentralization and
collaboration as empowering societal actors; 10 6 promoting dialogue
and deliberation; and 7 fostering tolerance, interdependence, and
0
mutual accountability.1
D. Bureaucraticvs. Dispersed Expertise
Expertise is essential for effective regulation and is a major
10 8
source of authority for private actors as well as for the state.
Because of the complexity of regulatory problems, multiple areas of
expertise are relevant: technical, regarding social or environmental
problems and regulatory solutions; normative, regarding social values
and the normative context; economic, regarding the operations of
target firms; and social, regarding the effects of regulation on
intended beneficiaries and the public. Old Governance assumes that
professional regulators possess or can develop all the expertise
necessary to implement appropriate policies. 10 9 New Governance, in
contrast, recognizes that expertise is often dispersed, and seeks to
harness a wide range of stakeholders who may have "local" expertise

125-26, 129. As a result, RSS could enhance engagement even in this relatively
participatory regime.
See CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 5 (arguing that private RSS schemes
104.
could come to be seen as more legitimate than public regulation).
Drawing on Habermas, Frykman and M6rth elaborate three conceptions of
105.
democracy: the liberal or aggregative; the republican or communitarian; and the
cosmopolitan or deliberative. Henrik Frykman & Ulrike M6rth, Soft Law and Three
Notions of Democracy: The Case of the EU, in SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND
REGULATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS, supra note 74, at 155, 157. The
republican tradition also emphasizes participation, but requires a relatively strong,
self-conscious community based on shared ethnicity or values. Id. at 157-58.
See Golub, Introduction, supra note 31, at 6 ("Another important
106.
advantage ... is ... direct public involvement ... ").
107.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 82-86; Freeman, Collaborative
Governance, supra note 68, at 23-24; Lobel, supra note 33, at 374, 378, 421; see Minow,
supra note 97, at 1244-45 (suggesting that these effects are especially valuable in large
countries, where deep engagement through traditional processes is problematic).
108.
BULL & MCNEILL, supra note 89, at 33-34; Claire Cutler et al., Private
Authority and International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 26, at 3, 18; Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities
and InternationalPolicy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1, 8, 17 (1992).
109.
Lobel, supra note 33, at 371-73.
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otherwise unavailable to the state.11 0 This range of stakeholders
includes firms, which have unique information about their industries
and their own internal operations where regulations must be
implemented."1
It also includes NGOs, which may have superior
knowledge about societal conditions and needs, as well as the actual
(rather than claimed) performance of firms. Mobilizing the expertise
of societal actors makes regulation better informed, better adapted to
local circumstances, more open to new knowledge, and more
1 2
innovative.l
In addition, it is important to emphasize that the required
expertise is not just about how to regulate, but also about who and
what (and, thus, whether) to regulate. The differing state roles in
Old Governance and New Governance derive in part from different
assumptions about what the state "knows" in these areas. Old
Governance is predicated on the assumption that the state knows the
"public interest" and hence the appropriate regulatory goals, perhaps
based on prior legislative action. By contrast, New Governance does
not assume that the state possesses complete a priori knowledge of
regulatory goals.
Rather, the collaborative procedures of New
Governance act as a public interest revelation mechanism: in New
Governance the state engages stakeholders on all sides of a
regulatory issue and collaboratively determines what actions are
desirable. In this respect, New Governance represents a "third way,"
responding not only to market failures but also to government
113
failures-here, the "bounded rationality" of the state.
E. Hard vs. Soft Law
Old Governance is rooted in "hard law";" 4 its regulations are
legally binding and mandatory. Hard law rules are generally uniform
across regions and categories of actors and are enforced by legal

110.
Id. at 373-74; see Trubek & Trubek, New Governance, supra note 32, at 557
(noting that similar arguments may support EU New Governance efforts that draw on
the expertise of member states).
111.
David Graham & Ngaire Woods, Making Corporate Self-Regulation
Effective in Developing Countries, 34 WORLD DEV. 868, 869 (2006).
112.
Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 68, at 22-23, 27-29.
113.
PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 2, 9.
114.
See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG.
401, 402 (2000) [hereinafter Abbott et al., Legalization]; Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 424-34
(2000). Kirton and Trebilcock define hard law as "a regime relying primarily on the
authority or power of the state-ultimately its legitimate monopoly on the means of
coercion-in the construction, operation, and implementation, including enforcement,
of arrangements at international, national, or subnational level." John J. Kirton &
Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable Global
Governance, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE,
ENVRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 3, 9.
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procedures backed by civil, administrative, or criminal sanctions. 1 15
Command-and-control regulations, moreover, are often precise and
detailed, mandating specific processes, designs, or actions ("input" or
"technological" regulation) or outcomes ("output" or "performance"
regulation).1 1 6
In the Old Governance model, compliance is
monitored by state-operated "police patrols," but in practice, "fire
alarm" citizen complaint mechanisms are also widely used." 7 The
latter have a New Governance flavor insofar as they mobilize the
inf6rmational advantages of local actors.
New Governance relies on more flexible norms and procedures
throughout the regulatory process. n 8 Private schemes in Zones 2, 3,
and 6 of the Triangle necessarily promulgate legally nonbinding
standards, 1 9 and public-private schemes in Zones 4, 5, and 7
typically do so as well. From a legal pluralist perspective, however,
120
all of these norms may be seen as "law" for participating firms.
State regulatory actions under New Governance are also relatively
soft. Regulations may be phrased in general terms 121 or may
establish flexible standards, targets, guidelines, or benchmarks
rather than precise requirements. They may mandate management
practices (e.g., EMS) rather than specific inputs or outputs, 12 2 or call
for disclosure or dialogue. 123
Examples include "performance-

115.
Trubek & Trubek, Open Method of Coordination,supra note 64, at 344.
116.
Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation:
PrescribingPrivate Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691,
691 (2003); Gunningham & Sinclair, supranote 31, at 53.
117.
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY
426, 427 (Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987).
118.
Lobel, supra note 33, at 380. Referring to these normative forms as "soft
law," as in Table 2, elides complex questions regarding the nature of "law" that arise in
both rationalist and constructivist approaches. See, e.g., Abbott et al., Legalization,
supra note 114; de Birca & Scott, supra note 37. We do not address those conceptual
questions here.
119.
See Kirton & Trebilcock, supra note 114, at 9 (defining soft law, unusually,
as private standards, those that rely "primarily on the participation and resources of
nongovernmental actors in the construction, operation, and implementation of a
governance arrangement").
120.
See Meidinger, Environmental Law-Making, supra note 31, at 299-300;
Wood, supranote 15, at 229.
121.
Such regulations resemble "standards" rather than "rules." See Kathleen
M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 26 (1992) (explaining that regulations affording
participants more discretion are generally considered "standards," as opposed to more
rigid "rules").
122.
See Wood, supra note 68, for a valuable analysis of EMS. Recent studies
conclude that ISO 14001 implementation leads to improved environmental
performance and legal compliance. Prakash & Potoski, supra note 40, at 351.
123.
Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, Emergent Cross-Sectional Soft Regulations:
Dynamics at Play in the Global Compact Initiative, in SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND
REGULATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS, supra note 74, at 129, 134.
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based" 124 and "management-based" regulation. 125 Often (as in the
EPA Performance Track), state agencies grant relief from substantive
mandates, inspections, or sanctions (e.g., waiving enterprise liability)
or grant a benefit (e.g., use of an "ecolabel") 126 for firms that accept
voluntary obligations or otherwise cooperate in achieving public
goals. 127 In all its forms, reliance on flexible standards supports the
central tenets of New Governance: multiplicity, experimentation, and
learning; 128 particularization to local circumstances; broad expertise;
and stakeholder engagement.
Even soft norms are nested in a formal legal system. 129 Binding
legal rules and procedures coexist with softer New Governance
approaches, complementing or competing with one another. 130 In
addition, law and New Governance frequently interact, as when the
state sets baseline rules or other substantive parameters for private
regulators, or oversees or ratifies self-regulatory and negotiated
The state can also step in with mandatory
arrangements. 131
regulation should firms fail to comply with soft measures. 13 2 Firms
can incur legal obligations by accepting New Governance
undertakings. In some forms of "regulatory negotiation" (Reg-Neg),
for example, the state asks a multi-stakeholder group to propose a
The resulting agreements are legally
regulatory approach. 133
134
binding, even if they are flexible as to means and timetables.
Finally, soft private commitments can feed back into hard law: they
play an important role in the discourse affecting the adoption and

See Coglianese et al., supra note 70, at 707.
124.
Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 116, at 691.
125.
126.
See generally Eva Eiderstrom, Ecolabels in EU Environmental Policy, in
NEW INSTRUMENTS, supra note 31, at 190.
127.
Such arrangements are more attractive to firms if governments can legally
bind themselves not to defect and return to mandatory regulation, but that power is in
doubt in many legal systems. Golub, Introduction, supra note 31, at 15.
New Governance views rules as provisional and more easily revised to
128.
reflect new information than hard regulations which require complex procedures to
modify. de Bdirca & Scott, supra note 32, at 3; Freeman, Collaborative Governance,
supra note 68, at 28-29; Smismans, supra note 67, at 5.
129.
Lobel, supra note 33, at 389.
130.
See Trubek & Trubek, New Governance, supra note 32, at 544-48.
131.
Id. at 548-49.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 103 (arguing that to be effective
132.
self-regulation must include a system of public detection and punishment); Freeman,
Collaborative Governance, supra note 68, at 32.
Meidinger, Environmental Law-Making, supra note 31, at 306. The results
133.
of these processes are highly controversial. Id.
Some supporters of public regulation see such agreements as particularly
134.
threatening, as they appear to replace disinterested regulatory decisions with the kinds
of deal making predicted by public choice theory. Freeman, Privatization, supra note
75, at 1303 n.67.
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application of mandatory law and can be incorporated directly into
135
state law.
F. Limits of Ideal Types
Both the Old Governance and New Governance ideal types rely
on assumptions that limit their applicability in both domestic and
international settings. First, both ideal types assume significant
state capacity and active state involvement. This is obvious in Old
Governance, where state commands and enforcement are central.
Although the state plays more subtle roles in New Governance, its
ability to catalyze, orchestrate, and set parameters for decentralized
regulatory actions-and its readiness to step in with mandatory
action where softer methods fail-are essential to effective, legitimate
regulation. 13 6 Yet these capacities are lacking in many countries and
in the international system.
Second, both ideal types assume
effective procedures for making choices in the public interest: Old
Governance assumes effective representative democracy, while New
Governance
assumes
effective
stakeholder
representation,
participation, and deliberation. But again, many states and private
institutions lack such procedures, as does the international system.
Third, and more fundamentally, both ideal types assume an
independent state that furthers the public interest (albeit in different
ways). 13 7 This assumption is vulnerable to the economic or public
choice critique that there is no "public interest," only private interests
with varying degrees of influence. 138
Interest groups lobby,
contribute to campaigns, pay bribes, and otherwise seek to persuade
regulators to advance their interests; they may even "capture"
regulators outright. 139 Regulators, in turn, are not public-spirited
and disinterested, but respond to the highest bidders in pursuit of
their private goals, such as remaining in office, expanding their
bureaucracy, or enriching themselves.
In evaluating the Old

135.
Private standards can also take on hard law authority through additional
channels, such as references by courts interpreting broad tort standards and
expectations of best practices by inspectors and regulators. Meidinger, Beyond
Westphalia, supra note 30, at 122-30. Courts and legislatures sometimes mandate the
observance of voluntary standards. Wood, supra note 15, at 248.
136.
Ayres & Braithwaite's influential proposal for "responsive regulation"
requires "pyramids" of regulatory strategies and sanctions, with public regulators able
to escalate to more coercive measures when softer approaches fail. AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 35-38.
137.
See Mattli & Woods, supra note 4, for critiques of this presumption.
138.
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups
for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).

139.

See Peltzman, supra note 138, at 228; Stigler, supra note 138, at 5.
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Governance and New Governance models, it is important to consider
how each deals with these political forces.

IV. OLD GOVERNANCE AND NEW GOVERNANCE AT
THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

In this section, we address how the Old Governance and New
Governance ideal types have been translated to the international
level. For most of the twentieth century, efforts by activists and
states to regulate the social and environmental impacts of
transnational production focused on Old Governance. Over the past
two decades, international regulatory activity has moved increasingly
toward something resembling New Governance. Because of the very
different characteristics of the international system, however, neither
effort to transpose an essentially domestic model has been wholly
successful.
A. InternationalOld Governance
1.

IGOs

Twentieth century efforts to build international governance were
part of a long-standing project to move the international system
closer to the Old Governance ideal type, exemplified by calls for world
federalism 140 and world peace through law. 14 1
Many early
international public unions and IGOs involved attempts to transpose
the regulatory structures, procedures, and powers of the state, in
areas such as labor rights, to international institutions. 142 Such
efforts have continued with recent attempts to incorporate a binding
"social clause" into the rules of the WTO. 143 Yet these idealistic

140.
The world federalist movement was created in 1947 through the
amalgamation of independent groups. "World federalists support the creation of
democratic global structures accountable to the citizens of the world and call for the
division of international authority among separate agencies, a separation of powers
among judicial, executive and parliamentary bodies." World Federalist Movement, Our
Vision and History, http://www.wfm.org/site/index.php/pages/l (last visited Feb. 16,
2009).
141.
See GRENVILLE CLARK & LouIs B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD
LAW (2d ed. 1960).
142.
See Alexander Thompson & Duncan Snidal, InternationalOrganization,in
5 ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON. 692, 692-722 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Gees
eds., 2000); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborersin a
Global Labor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 93, 104 (1999) (arguing that
"global optimists" believe the institutions and protections of national labor relations
systems can be replicated on the international level).
143.
Van Wezel Stone, supra note 142, at 105-06.
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aspirations have not been fulfilled, at least outside the EU, and seem
as remote as ever.
The difficulty of replicating domestic Old Governance stems from
the anarchic structure of the international system. No global "state"
has authority to adopt mandatory regulations or impose sanctions.
States are jealous of their sovereignty and freedom of action, and
resist delegating authority to international institutions.
Widely
differing preferences make international agreements costly to
negotiate, while the divergence between individual and collective
state interests impedes collective action. Power differentials further
shape collective action away from at least some conceptions of the
global public interest.
The most significant attempt to internationalize Old Governance
has been the creation of an array of issue-specific IGOs, including the
UN's specialized agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the
WTO. Although IGOs might seem analogous to national regulatory
agencies, all are far weaker than the ideal Old Governance agency
because of the systemic features just noted. Table 3 summarizes the
analytic differences between IGOs and the Old Governance ideal type
defined in Table 2.
Old Governance

IGOs

State-centric

Member-centric

Centralized

Limited Centralization

Bureaucratic Expertise

Bureaucratic Expertise

Mandatory Rules

Recommendations

Table 3: International Old Governance through IGOs
First, although IGOs are created and governed by their member
states, 144 they are not state-centric, as in the Old Governance ideal
type. To conform to the Old Governance model, IGOs themselves
would have to possess state-like authority for mandatory regulation
and enforcement. Thus far, states have been unwilling to grant such
authority. In addition, powerful member states exercise substantial,
often disproportionate influence over IGOs; this undermines their
representativeness, independence, and global public interest
orientation, some of the most normatively attractive features of Old
Governance.

144.
Increasing civil society participation in many IGOs does not change this
basic principle.
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IGO centralization is also limited. While member states often
145
centralize administrative and operational functions within IGOs,
they rarely centralize the adoption and implementation of rules.
Moreover, even when formal decision procedures are available, many
IGOs operate by consensus among member states, often constraining
their already limited authority. Important issues frequently remain
within the political and financial control of member states, which
exercise such control in pursuit of national interests.
IGOs are important centers of bureaucraticexpertise, much as in
the OG model. Many of their most common and significant functions
(e.g., collecting and analyzing information, technical assistance)
depend on the expertise of IGO secretariats. These are made up of
international civil servants, typically selected on the basis of
knowledge and experience as well as geographic representation and
other political considerations. National delegates are also frequently
selected for their technical expertise.
Even when granted rule-making authority, IGOs are rarely
authorized to adopt mandatory rules, as states do in domestic Old
Governance. Treaties and other legally binding rules require state
ratification to take effect, even after adoption by IGOs. Some IGOs
are authorized to adopt regulations (e.g., the Standards and
Recommended Practices of the International Civil Aviation
Organization), 146 but in almost all cases states may choose to opt in
or out. Other IGO rules take the form of recommendations or other
nonbinding soft law. In addition, most IGO efforts to encourage rule
adoption and implementation are "managerial,"'1 47 not coercive.
Finally, whereas the Old Governance ideal type assumes that the
state can directly regulate private actors, international Old
Governance is typically indirect, requiring or urging states to
implement regulations that govern private actors in their
8
jurisdictions. 14

145.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal
InternationalOrganizations,42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 9 (1998) [hereinafter Abbott &
Snidal, Organizations].
146.
United Nations Convention on International Civil Aviation arts. 37-38,
Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, ICAO Doc. 7300/9 (2006), available at http://treaties.un.
org/doc/Publication/UNTSfVolume%2015/volume- 15-II-102-English.pdf.
147.
See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 229-49 (1995).

148.
The point is not that IGOs can never address private actors-although they
do so only infrequently-but that in doing so they deviate from international Old
Governance. The OECD Guidelines and UN Global Compact are innovative in part
because they address firms directly and in part because they do so in novel ways. See
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISES (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf;
United Nations Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/index.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2009). On this point, the EU more closely resembles the Old
Governance model, in that it can adopt rules with direct effect in national legal
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The ILO, the central international agency on labor rights,
illustrates how IGOs fall short of the Old Governance model. While
its tripartite character (worker and employer representatives
participate in its political organs) renders the ILO atypical, in most
respects it is the strongest manifestation of. international Old
Governance in the issue areas addressed in this Article. 149 The ILO
is member-centric: under its Constitution (a treaty), only states can
be members' 50 (states nominate worker and employer delegates by
agreement with representative organizations). 15 1 Although the ILO's
central purpose is to adopt international labor standards-forms of
regulation-the organization has far less regulatory authority than
any state. 152 Its main labor standards take the form of treaties that
require state ratification, supplemented by recommendations; its
implementation procedures rely on peer and expert review and other
managerial techniques. 153 Similarly, the ILO has limited centralized
authority. Member states have largely retained that authority
through their voting power in the political organs (subject to that of
worker and employer delegates), 154 their ratification power, and their
financial control. 155
The International Labor Office has greater
authority than many secretariats, but still less than domestic
regulatory agencies.
Bureaucratic expertise is a major ILO strength. The Labor
Office collects and disseminates information on labor issues, studies
proposals for ILO action, conducts investigations, and provides

systems. European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters,
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legalorder/ legalorder-ec-en.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2009).
149.
In some respects, the ILO operates like a state-based organization in spite
of its tripartite character, e.g., states must ratify approved conventions before they
take effect. ILO Constitution art. 19, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712 [hereinafter ILO
Constitution]. In some areas its tripartite character has greater influence; we place the
ILO Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, a soft law instrument
that addresses firms directly, in Zone 7.
150.
Id. art. 1(2).
151.
Id. art. 3.
152.
At the 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore, member states
rejected calls for a "social clause" and declared that the ILO was the proper venue for
considering labor rights. Labor organizations then urged governments to grant the ILO
greater authority, but state and employer delegates rejected these proposals. The ILO
reasserted its leadership by adopting the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work in 1998. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 142, at 105-08. See Laurence R.
Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and
Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006), for a valuable analysis of these and
other institutional developments over the history of the ILO.
153.
Van Wezel Stone, supra note 142, at 106-08.
154.
State delegates constitute 50% of those organs, worker and employer
delegates 25% each. ILO Constitution, supra note 149, art. 3.
155.
The expenses of the ILO are borne by its members under its Constitution
and agreement with the UN. Id. art. 13
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technical assistance; its expertise is highly regarded. 156 It also
collaborates with private actors, particularly worker and employer
organizations, more than many other IGOs. Finally, although the
ILO seeks to establish labor standards as mandatory rules, even
conventions approved by the Conference require state consent to take
effect. 157
Nonbinding
recommendations
guide
convention
implementation. The ILO Constitution establishes "supervision" and
complaint procedures to enforce labor standards, but only supervision
is regularly used, and it relies on persuasion, publicity and peer
158
pressure; no ILO procedure entails mandatory sanctions.
2.

Unilateral State Action

While IGOs were created in large part as responses to failures of
domestic Old Governance with respect to transborder issues, their
inadequacies have led to continuing calls to extend domestic Old
Governance transnationally. Advocates of this form of regulation
argue that states having authority or leverage over firms responsible
for transnational production externalities should unilaterally
regulate their conduct. 159 Although states are highly diverse, for
simplicity we consider two sets of potential regulators: developing
countries, which feel the brunt of most transnational production
externalities; and developed countries, which are the home of most
multinational enterprises (MNEs), the source of most foreign
investment, and the largest global markets.

156.
See ILO, How the ILO Works, http://www.ilo.org/global/About-theILO/
Structure/lang--enindex.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
157.
The ILO had adopted 188 conventions as of June 2007. ILO, International
Labour Standards, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/regionlafpro/daressalaamlstandards/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). Its Constitution requires member governments to
present approved conventions for consideration by the appropriate national authorities.
ILO Constitution, supra note 149, art. 19. Yet ratification remains a state decision, and it
has been highly uneven. Because of this poor track record, the ILO now focuses on
gaining broad adherence to eight "fundamental" and four "priority" conventions. ILO,
Conventions and Recommendations, http:/lwww.ilo.org/globallWhat-we do/International
LabourStandards/IntroductionConventionsandRecommendations/lang--enindex.htm
(ast visited Mar. 7, 2009). The ILO regards its 1998 Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work as morally binding even on members that have not ratified
those conventions, but its implementation procedures are merely promotional. ROGER
BLANPAIN & MICHELE COLUccI, THE GLOBALIZATION OF LABOUR STANDARDS: THE SOFT
LAW TRACK 41 (2004).

158.
ILO Constitution, supra note 149, arts. 26-29.
159.
A prominent recent example is the Corporate Responsibility Coalition
(CORE) campaign for UK and EU legislation to regulate foreign social and
environmental impacts of national corporate groups. See JENNIFER A. ZERK, CORP.
RESP. COALITION, CORPORATE ABUSE IN 2007: A DISCUSSION PAPER ON WHAT CHANGES

IN THE LAW NEED TO HAPPEN (2007), available at http://www.corporatejustice.orgIMG
pdf/corporateabuse discussionpaper.pdf, for a summary of legislative alternatives
currently considered by CORE.
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Developing countries are often inadequate regulators due to
insufficient capability or willingness. 6 0 If developing countries could
effectively regulate their own economies (including transnational
firms operating there), domestic Old Governance could satisfactorily
control many production externalities. 16 1 Unfortunately, in many
developing countries, this is not the case. 162 Even though most have
satisfactory laws on the books in areas such as labor rights-as
reflected in IECA++ in Zone 1 of the Triangle-their lack of
monitoring and enforcement capacities undermines the effectiveness
of these laws.
Critics argue that international competition creates a "race to
the bottom" that limits how strictly developing countries are willing
to regulate. 163 Scholars have found little empirical evidence of such a
race. 164 However, even without a downward race, international
competition limits the willingness of developing (and other) countries
to enforce existing regulations, let alone to strengthen them. Even
more fundamentally, many developing country governments do not
view strengthening labor and environmental regulation as a vital
165
policy goal because of its potential impact on economic growth.
This shifts the issue from capacity and will to the difficult normative
question of what standards are appropriate in different
circumstances. While the principle of subsidiarity might suggest that
developing countries should be allowed to choose lower standards to
promote growth or meet other local needs, 166 the questionable level of

160.
Rawls uses the terms "burdened societies" and "outlaw states" to refer to
these categories. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 90 (1999).
161.
Natalie L. Bridgeman & David B. Hunter, Narrowing the Accountability
Gap: Toward a New Foreign Investor Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 187, 195 (2008).
162.
Id. at 195-99; see also Braithwaite, supra note 35, at 888-89; Graham &
Woods, supra note 111, at 868-69.
163.
See, e.g., Van Wezel Stone, supra note 142, at 95 (highlighting the "fear
that globalization will marginalize or supplant national politics by virtue of its
tendency to undermine the capacity of nation-states to regulate their own domestic
economies" and the prediction "that globalization will lead to the demise of the Western
welfare state, the decline of Western labor movements, and the deterioration of labor
standards everywhere"); Lori Wallach, Introduction: It's Not About Trade, in WHOSE
TRADE ORGANIZATION? A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO 1, 8-16 (Lori Wallach &
Patrick Woodall eds., 2004) (discussing the adverse effects of WTO compliance around
the world).
164.
See Prakash & Potoski, supra note 40, at 352-53 (citing sources). See
generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International
Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141 (2002)
[hereinafter Abbott & Snidal, Values] (summarizing empirical and theoretical debate
over "race to the bottom").
165.
Graham & Woods, supranote 111, at 869.
166.
Subsidiarity is a principle of European Union (EU) law, embodied in Article
5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. See Treaty Establishing the
European Community art. 5, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 5 [hereinafter EC
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democracy in many of those states, coupled with problems of
corruption and capture, undermine their legitimacy for making these
167
decisions.
Alternatively, developed countries might regulate the foreign
conduct of domestic MNEs and investors; forbid imports of goods
produced abroad under poor social or environmental conditions; and
require domestic importers, retailers, and firms with transnational
supply chains to impose high standards on foreign suppliers. But this
strategy also faces problems of capability, willingness, and
legitimacy. 168
Transnational regulation strains the regulatory
capacities of even developed country governments, given the difficulty
of collecting information about firms' foreign operations. Indeed,
some firms "exit" their home countries by moving domestic operations
offshore precisely because they become more difficult to observe and
control. Moreover, transnational regulation is difficult to implement:
for example, developing-country workers protected by a developed
country law face legal and practical obstacles in attempting to sue
169
companies that harm them in that country's courts.
The problems go beyond capacity to willingness. Since foreigners
do not vote in national elections and domestic publics are naturally
less attentive to far-off problems, developed countries lack any strong
political interest in regulating externalities felt abroad.
Costly
altruistic actions-especially if they might undermine national
growth or competitiveness-may even be viewed negatively by certain
domestic groups. 170 Domestic firms resist regulation and seek to

Treaty] (providing that EU institutions should not take legal or regulatory action,
except in areas in which they have exclusive competence, unless action at EU level
would be more effective than action at the national, regional or local level). The
principle, like its analogues in other areas of law, is designed to ensure that decisions
are taken as close as possible to the citizen. See Lobel, supra note 33, at 381-86
(discussing decentralization and subsidiarity).
167.
See, e.g., Margaret Levi & April Linton, Fair Trade: A Cup at a Time?, 31
POL. & SOC'Y 407, 414 (2003) ("Interlocking [government] relationships and interests
with agribusiness make it unlikely that governments in coffee-producing countries will
voluntarily regulate the coffee industry in ways that benefit small growers and
workers.")
168.
Daniel Drezner argues that powerful developed countries have the capacity
to regulate internationally and unilaterally set many rules that bind developing
countries. DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS Is GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL

REGULATORY REGIMES 5 (2007). However, the financial and other areas Drezner
examines differ substantially from transnational production. Whereas developed
countries feel the effects of foreign financial externalities, production externalities
generally flow in the opposite direction, reducing developed country incentives to
regulate. Moreover, Drezner's positive argument focuses on power politics and does not
address normative issues.
169.
Bridgeman & Hunter, supra note 161, at 200-05; Van Wezel Stone, supra
note 142, at 115-16.
170.

Not only are [governments] not well placed to define the common
interests of populations that fall outside their national boundaries, but
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avoid or weaken it through capture. 171 Conversely, transnational
regulation might be captured and unduly strengthened by
protectionist interests that seize on foreign production conditions as
an excuse to limit imports.
Finally, transnational extension of domestic Old Governance
raises significant legal and normative issues, both domestic and
international. For examples, to avoid interference in foreign affairs,
U.S. courts generally presume (absent clear expressions 1of
72
Congressional intent) that statutes do not apply extraterritorially.
There has also been a long-standing dispute in international law over
the lawfulness of extraterritorial regulation that interferes with the
policy preferences of foreign states. 173 Decisions under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exacerbated the difficulties
by suggesting that states cannot lawfully impose import restrictions
recent WTO cases
based on foreign production processes; 174 1more
75
provide greater regulatory leeway, however.
Even if developed countries were willing and had legal capacity
and authority to regulate transnationally, their legitimacy would be a
concern. Whatever their own characteristics, individual states are
not globally representative; given the sharp policy differences
between North and South, developed countries' legitimacy for
1 76
unilaterally making international policy choices is questionable.

they also have a vested interest in creating or maintaining conditions
that ensure national economic stability and growth regardless of the
impact of their policies on the welfare of people in other national
jurisdictions.
Cragg, supra note 3, at 220.
See, e.g., Levi & Linton, supra note 167, at 414 ("[The interest of Northern
171.
MNEs that process coffee] is in buying coffee beans at the lowest price. They are often
effective lobbyists against domestic legislation for new standards.").
E.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) (refusing to apply
172.
wage and hour law to laborers working abroad). Only a few U.S. labor statutes extend
to the foreign conduct of national firms. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 142, at 114-15.
Van Wezel Stone, supra note 142, at 117; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
173.
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 401-403 (1987) (proposing principles to
resolve conflicts of national prescriptive jurisdiction).
174.
See generally Panel Report, United States-Restrictionson Imports of Tuna,
WT/DS29/R (June 16, 1994); Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna,WT/DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991).
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of
175.
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998) (exemplifying
greater leeway on the part of the WTO). See generally JASON POTTS, INT'L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE LEGALITY OF PPMS UNDER THE GATT: CHALLENGES AND
available at
(2008),
POLICY
TRADE
SUSTAINABLE
FOR
OPPORTUNITIES
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/ppms-gatt.pdf (summarizing current WTO law that
suggests the expanded scope for "process and production method" regulation).
176.
"Democratic governments can speak for ... only the common interests of
those who elect them." Cragg, supra note 3, at 219. "The problem with democratic
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Moreover, because developed country regulation would most often
influence business activity in developing countries, it might impose
inappropriate standards or cultural values. 177 Such concerns feed
back into states' willingness to regulate: in 2001, for example, an
Australian parliamentary committee recommended against adopting
the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000, which would have governed
national firms operating abroad, in part because it might be viewed
178
as "arrogant, patronizing, paternalistic and racist."
B. TransnationalNew Governance
The shortcomings of international Old Governance have led
concerned actors to develop the alternative of transnational RSS. The
increasingly dense constellation of RSS schemes on the Governance
Triangle is developing into a system of Transnational New
Governance that complements, competes with, and sometimes serves
as a substitute for national and international Old Governance. This
emerging system closely resembles the New Governance ideal type on
several- important dimensions: decentralization, dispersed expertise,
and reliance on soft law. However, the system differs significantly in
terms of its most basic feature: the role of the state. Table 4
summarizes these similarities and differences.
New Governance

Emerging Transnational
New Governance

State orchestration

Limited state orchestration

Decentralized

Highly decentralized

Dispersed expertise

Dispersed expertise

Soft law

Voluntary codes
Table 4: Transnational New Governance

We begin by analyzing the areas of similarity-the three final
dimensions in Table 4-and then turn to the relative lack of state
orchestration, the greatest current weakness of Transnational New
Governance.

regimes is that 'the publics' whose interests the regimes are justified in protecting and
advancing are national publics." Id.
177.
See Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation, supra note 23,
at 526-31 (assessing possible responses to Northern regulatory "imperialism").
178.
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT STATUTORY COMM. ON CORP. & SEC., REPORT ON THE
CORPORATE CODE OF CONDUCT BILL 2000, at 16 (2001), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corporations ctte/completed-inquiries/199902/corp-code/report/index.htm.
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Decentralization

The most striking feature of the system depicted on the
Governance Triangle is the decentralization of regulatory authority
from the state to private and public-private schemes. The degree of
decentralization is greatest across the lowest tier of the Triangle
(Zones 2, 3, and 6). Schemes in that tier primarily entail actions by
and collaboration among private actors; the direct role of public
actors-states or IGOs-is very limited. However, as the numerous
schemes near the Firm and NGO vertices of the Triangle suggest, the
current system is far more decentralized than the New Governance
model contemplates; many of those schemes are not deeply enmeshed
in a regulatory network, let alone one orchestrated by the state.
Schemes in the middle tier of the Triangle (the central and lower
portions of Zones 4, 5, and 7) involve formal collaborations between
states or IGOs and private actors at one or more stages of the
regulatory process; they closely resemble New Governance publicprivate partnerships. Schemes in the upper tier of the Triangle (Zone
1 and the upper portions of Zones 4, 5, and 7) are more centralized,
involving complete or at least significant state participation through
Old Governance national laws, domestic New Governance schemes
such as national eco-labels, or voluntary IGO schemes with New
Governance features.
Even more important is the decentralized character of
Transnational New Governance as a whole. The emerging system is
highly pluralized, with a significant and growing number of diverse
schemes, none of which has authority over any other. 179 This
multiplicity and diversity is promoted by relatively low "barriers to
entry," which offer significant new opportunities for participation and
engagement by firms, NGOs, and the beneficiaries of regulation.
Even NGOs with limited resources, such as the Clean Clothes
Campaign and Rugmark, can promulgate and promote codes. The
result is that different types of schemes frequently operate in parallel
in pursuit of shared objectives, albeit with significant variations in
norms and procedures. These schemes often compete but sometimes
collaborate, most formally in alliances such as the International
Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labeling Alliance
80
(ISEAL).1

179.
See O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 18-20 (discussing the diversity of RSS
schemes).
180.
ISEAL is an alliance of major multi-stakeholder standards schemes that
defines and codifies best practices in the adoption and implementation of voluntary
standards, most notably in its Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and
Environmental Standards, serves as a forum for high-quality standards schemes and
provides technical assistance to new schemes. As of 2007, seven member schemes (six
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Dispersed Expertise

Effective RSS requires all the forms of expertise identified
earlier: normative, technical, economic, and social. Transnational
New Governance is similar to the New Governance model in not
relying solely on state or IGO regulators for needed expertise, except
within some Zone 1 schemes.1 81 Instead, private RSS schemes draw
primarily on the expertise of the societal actors that create and
govern them. As a result, however, the range of expertise found
within any one scheme depends on the actors it engages. Single-actor
schemes near the vertices of the Triangle have a limited range of
expertise, whereas collaborative schemes closer to the center engage
wider ranges of expertise. A major rationale of multi-stakeholder
schemes like those in Zone 6 is to combine complementary sources of
expertise.
3.

Soft Law

The emerging Transnational New Governance system relies
heavily on voluntary principles, codes, procedures, and (to the extent
states and IGOs are involved) soft law. Private schemes lack
authority to promulgate hard law; they also lack the capacity for
coercive enforcement, relying on economic and social pressure from
consumers and other constituencies, potential commercial benefits,
and the implicit threat of state regulation to induce firms to adopt
and comply with their norms. Even when the state is involved,
Transnational New Governance relies on New Governance techniques
rather than Old Governance coercive regulation. IGOs, including the
OECD, ILO, and UN, increasingly use soft law to address firms
directly and to increase the flexibility and attractiveness of the norms
they promote. As in the New Governance model, however, some
Transnational New Governance norms have been embodied in legally
binding instruments.1 8 2 Complementarily, private RSS schemes rely
heavily on state-generated rules and norms, including treaty rules, as
the principal benchmarks for their own voluntary norms. This has
the interesting consequence that state-generated norms that fail to

in Zone 6 of the Triangle and one in Zone 3) were in full compliance with the Code of
Good Practice. See ISEAL Alliance, http://www.isealalliance.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
Feature.showFeature&CategoryID=25&FeatureID=131 (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
181.
Some Zone 1 schemes, especially those near the vertex, are essentially Old
Governance. New Governance-influenced schemes lower in Zone 1 typically involve
consultation with business and civil society groups and collaboration with target firms.
182.
For example, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
(Zone 7) have been incorporated into binding agreements between multinational
investors and host governments. Ruggie, supra note 5, at 835.

544

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42..501

become effective through hard law may find a second life in the
voluntary codes of private RSS schemes.
4.

State Orchestration

The role of the state is the major distinction between the
emerging Transnational New Governance system and the New
Governance ideal type. In the New Governance model, the state
authorizes, empowers, and orchestrates the public and private actors
and institutions to which it assigns regulatory responsibilities.
Moreover, the state acts to structure the regulatory network, e.g., to
limit excessive influence by firms or other groups within private
schemes, or to require that schemes observe basic procedural and
substantive norms. Finally, the domestic state has the capacity to
intervene effectively when necessary to correct the actions of private
regulators, and this background role shapes the interactions of other
actors. Most transnational RSS schemes, in contrast, have been
created from the bottom up, with little direct state involvement, by
private actors-notably NGOs frustrated by the inability of states
and IGOs to address perceived transnational regulatory problems,
and firms and industry groups seeking to preempt or shape stricter
regulation.1 8 3 Furthermore, as with international Old Governance,
states have limited means to correct bottom-up regulation in the
184
transnational context.
Two types of orchestration can be observed in Transnational
New Governance, although in most cases their extent is modest.
First, several schemes in the upper tier of the Governance Triangle
involve "directive orchestration," in which states and IGOs use
mandatory rules, binding conditions on public benefits, and similar
measures to steer RSS in desired directions. For example, the EU
enforces mandatory conditions for firms that participate in EMAS,
while the IFC Safeguard Policies are enforceable requirements for
clients in its financing programs. 8 5 Second, even though states and

183.
See Abbott & Snidal, Governance Triangle, supra note 46, at 2, 14-19
(discussing the emergence of non-state and public-private governance arrangements).
184.
Kingsbury et al., supra note 16, at 54-56.
185.
Other IGOs involved in RSS explicitly eschew directive orchestration. The
UNGC asks participating firms to satisfy only very weak conditions, principally
making a formal commitment; UN procurement guidelines encourage-but do not
require-suppliers to participate in the UNGC; and the OECD enlists national officials
to promote its Guidelines, yet national efforts vary widely and are almost always weak.
See United Nations Governance Centre, http://www.ungc.org (last visited Feb. 16,
2009); UN Procurement Division, http://www.un.org/depts/ptd/conditions.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2009) (listing UN General Terms and Conditions of Contract);
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/
department0,3355,en_2649_34889_1_l_1,00.html
(last visited Feb. 16, 2009)
(covering guidelines for multinational enterprises).
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IGOs are not centrally involved in the predominantly private schemes
in the lowest tier of the Triangle, they sometimes engage in
"facilitative orchestration," or supportive actions that encourage and
enhance the development of desired forms of RSS. For example, the
U.S. Department of Labor convened a broad range of apparel industry
stakeholders as the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), thereby
setting the initial framework for RSS in that sector.18 6 Material and
moral support for schemes that meet public standards is another
form of facilitation: for example, the Department of State has
financially assisted several transnational labor rights schemes. 18 7
Even indirect contributions, such as ILO promulgation of labor
standards on which private schemes can subsequently build, can
facilitate RSS. In the public-private partnerships across the middle
tier of the Triangle, states and IGOs engage in variants of both
approaches.
Transnational New Governance is clearly evolving with a
different balance among these forms of orchestration than in domestic
New Governance theory: directive orchestration is less prominent,
facilitative orchestration more so. Overall, however, there is little
doubt that states and IGOs do not currently provide the level of
orchestration called for by the New Governance ideal type. Part V
explores the implications of this deficiency, while Part VI suggests
how states and IGOs could orchestrate more effectively.

V. EVALUATING TRANSNATIONAL NEW GOVERNANCE
Transnational New Governance remains a nascent system,
emerging gradually and spontaneously from the expanding array of
RSS schemes on the Governance Triangle. Even in its current form,
Transnational New Governance shows real promise for strengthening
international regulation: filling regulatory gaps, enhancing the
impact of IGOs and treaties, and providing other benefits of New
Governance. As currently constituted, however, Transnational New
Governance differs substantially from the New Governance ideal
type, primarily in the limited degree of centralized orchestration at
the international level. This "orchestration deficit" prevents today's
Transnational New Governance from achieving all the benefits of

186.
See Alexis M. Herman, Sec'y of Labor, Remarks at the Marymount
University Academic Search for Sweatshop Solutions (May 30, 1997), available at
http://www.dol.gov/oasamlprogramslhistorylhermanJspeeches/sp970603.htm
(discussing the development of the AIP from a DOL perspective).
187.
See U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, Fact Sheet FY 2004-2005 Human Rights and Democracy Fund Projects (July
28, 2005), http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drllrls/50318.htm (listing expenditures of the
Human Rights and Democracy Fund for fiscal year 2004-2005).
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New Governance, yet it also suggests that the potential of
Transnational New Governance can be more fully realized if states
and IGOs provide more effective orchestration and support.
The most significant strengths and weaknesses of Transnational
New Governance relate to the first two elements of the New
Governance ideal type: decentralization and orchestration. This Part
is organized around those categories; it briefly addresses the other
two elements, dispersed expertise and soft law, within that analysis.
A. Decentralization
Decentralization is a hallmark of the New Governance model,
but decentralization in that model is to some degree centrally
orchestrated by the state. Decentralization in Transnational New
Governance, in contrast, is the result of independent decisions by
private and some public actors to initiate individual RSS schemes; as
a result, viewed as a system of governance, RSS has been largely
88
spontaneous and unplanned.1
Transnational New Governance in its current form thus shares
the strengths and weaknesses of spontaneous social orders. Consider
the closely related but generally simpler issue of technical product
standards. 8 9 Because firms are close to production processes, they
are usually better positioned than centralized state agencies to
develop technical standards and adapt them to changing
But a wholly decentralized and spontaneous
circumstances.
standard-setting process can produce a cacophony of incompatible
standards. This outcome is costly for an industry even though it
results from the actions of individual firms within that industry, each
advancing standards that serve its individual, sometimes
monopolistic, interests. To improve social outcomes, states often
coordinate technical standards, although earlier top-down efforts
have progressively given way to more bottom-up approaches, in which
the state collaborates with and orchestrates private standard-setting
bodies through institutions such as the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) and ISO. 190 Coordination is desirable in this setting

188.
Significant exceptions include the UNGC, ILO Tripartite Declaration, AIP,
PRI, and ISO 14000. See UNGC, About UNGC, http://www.ungc.org (last visited Feb.
16, 2009); ILO, About the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about the ilo/lang-enlindex.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); Herman, supra note 186; PRI, About PRI,
http://www.unpri.org/about (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); ISO, About ISO,
http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). To varying extents, such
efforts demonstrate the advantages of IGO and state roles in RSS.
189.
See generally Abbott & Snidal, International Standards, supra note 27
(analyzing technical product standards in comparison to regulatory standards).
190.
Directive orchestration of ISO is limited, largely because of the technical
issues it addresses. But states were instrumental in its formation, authorize
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even though product standards, while technically complex, are
relatively simple in terms of their stakeholders and social
consequences. By contrast, RSS involves much more challenging
regulatory issues.
Here we address the advantages and disadvantages of the strong
decentralization that currently 'characterizes Transnational New
We first consider the distribution of regulatory
Governance.
authority that results from strong decentralization, and then analyze
certain specific effects of the multiplicity of RSS schemes and the
opportunities for participation they create.
1.

Distribution of Regulatory Authority

In the emerging Transnational New Governance system,
regulatory authority is distributed across a wide variety of RSS
schemes, themselves governed by a broad range of actors. States and
IGOs are directly involved in institutions in the upper and middle
tiers of the Governance Triangle. Far more striking, however, is the
extensive private ordering across the lower tier of the Triangle, the
locus of much recent Transnational New Governance activity. This
distribution of authority engages two major goals of New Governance:
bringing the dispersed expertise, resources, and capacities of private
actors into the regulatory system, and reducing the demands on
public institutions. Because of the international orchestration deficit,
however, these advantages are coupled with certain shortcomings.
Unplanned decentralization has led to significant gaps and
overlaps in regulatory coverage, particularly across products and
industries. While self-regulation by firms is extensive, its emergence,
content, and strength depend heavily on idiosyncratic factors such as
normative commitments of top executives, strategic decisions to
emphasize corporate social responsibility, organizational cultures,
and, especially, characteristics of specific markets. 191 For example,
producers of differentiated consumer products, such as designer
apparel, are more likely to see marketing advantages in pursuing
socially and environmentally conscious strategies-and to see
potential dangers in not doing so-than are producers of
undifferentiated intermediate hardware products. 192 The former also
are likely to be less tightly constrained by bottom-line concerns due to

participation by private standards bodies, collaborate in its operations, and present a
background threat of intervention if it acts improperly. Id. at 15.
Sasser et al., supra note 2, at 11-12; see Jennifer Howard-Grenville,
191.
Jennifer Nash & Cary Coglianese, Constructingthe License to Operate:Internal Factors

and Their Influence on CorporateEnvironmental Decisions, 30 L. & POLY 73, 74 (2008)
(finding that individual firms subject to similar external pressures respond differently
due to internal cultures and management incentives).
192.
Howard-Grenville et al., supra note 191, at 83.
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differentiated markets. For parallel reasons, NGO and collaborative
schemes focus on vulnerable targets, such as consumer goods firms
that rely on brand reputation (e.g., Nike), "branded" retailers (e.g.,
Home Depot and Wal-Mart), and other actors in similar situations
(e.g., universities selling "branded" merchandise).
Thus, in the
apparel industry, multiple schemes target major producers; two even
focus on university apparel. But sectors such as hardware, especially
those dominated by small firms, remain "under the radar" of activists
193
and largely untouched by Transnational New Governance.
In addition, Transnational New Governance is currently
characterized by a disproportionate concentration of single-actor RSS
schemes, especially in Zone 2 of the Triangle.
Even if their
participants are normatively motivated, Firm schemes reflect
individual interests or values that do not necessarily coincide with
the broader public interest. Although many firms and executives are
committed to ethical values and most seek good reputations, firms
must focus primarily on profit and, therefore, oppose regulation that
threatens it. 194 Firms also prefer self-regulation for its businessfriendly standards, low compliance costs, and limited intrusion by
outsiders.
Thus, self-regulation is often limited in depth and
breadth 195 and relatively opaque to outsiders. Opacity leaves many
openings for opportunism, 196 in turn creating credibility problems for
sincere firms.
Similar problems arise with the single-actor NGO schemes in
Zone 3. NGOs are usually motivated by values, although some, such
as labor unions, are motivated by interests. But even value-driven
NGOs, such as human rights groups, must attend to organizational
goals in order to succeed. 19 7 They may choose policies that please
vocal activists or attract donors rather than serving all concerned

193.
See O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 22 (discussing regulatory implementation
challenges).
194.
Firms favor regulation that enhances profit, e.g., by limiting competition.
For example, highly-capitalized British industrialists supported early child labor
legislation to limit competition from smaller firms dependent on cheap labor. See
Lawrence W. Reed, Child Labor and the British Industrial Revolution (1976), available
at http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?id=3879
(discussing the intended and
unintended consequences of child labor laws). In the areas we consider here, regulation
typically threatens profit, although some social or environmental branding strategies
may enhance it, allowing firms to "do well by doing good."
195.
On the limited effectiveness of business codes, especially for the
environment, see Wood, supra note 15, at 254-65. CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 15
argue that firms see business codes as opportunities to communicate the virtues of
existing practices.
196.
See Kimberley D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 526 (2003) (discussing opportunism).
197.
See generally Abbott & Snidal, Values, supra note 164 (discussing the
pursuit of goals by value activists and the political tactics reflecting motivating beliefs).
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More broadly, even value-driven NGOs do not
stakeholders.
necessarily represent the public interest: worker rights groups, for
example, typically discount interests such as economic growth more
heavily than would the hypothetical median voter, either in the
affected state or globally.
Single-actor schemes, moreover, do not possess all of the
competencies necessary for effective regulation: expertise of several
kinds, concrete operational capacities (including resources),
and
regulation,
of
targets
the
from
independence
Firm schemes have unparalleled business
representativeness. 198
expertise and managerial capacity, but lack independence and
NGO schemes have
represent only narrow economic interests.
normative expertise, significant operational capacities (e.g., for
influencing and mobilizing public opinion), and substantial
independence. Yet they have little business expertise, managerial
capacity, or resources, and their representativeness varies widely and
Even State schemes lack important
is frequently challenged.
competencies for regulation in transnational settings: 199 their
expertise and information on business practices are limited, their
regulatory authority and capacity are reduced, and their
independence and representativeness are compromised (from a global
perspective) to the extent they promote national interests. IGOs fare
better on many of these issues, but have limited regulatory authority,
resources, and management capacity.
Collaborative schemes address these problems by including
multiple actors who together possess a more representative range 20of0
motivations and a fuller range of complementary competencies.
Zone 6 schemes, such as FSC, SAI, GRI, and FLO, bring together
private sector and civil society groups with diverse interests, values,
expertise, and operational capacities. 20 1 Participation by NGOs
makes these schemes more representative than pure Firm schemes;
business participation strengthens their operational capacities for
implementing standards over pure NGO schemes; and their multi-

See Abbott & Snidal, Governance Triangle, supra note 46, at 19-29
198.
(discussing competencies essential to effective regulatory action); see Black, supra note
30, at 63 (identifying actors' regulatory capacities).
Developed states possess most competencies for domestic regulation.
199.
200.
Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia, supra note 30, at 128-29, characterizes
schemes like FSC as networks, bringing together firms, activists, professionals,
government officials, indigenous groups, and other actors. See O'Rourke, supra note 29,
at 4-6 (suggesting that the network form of such arrangements is designed to match
the new structures of global production).
201.
In some of these schemes, states or IGOs have acted as facilitator, as
UNEP has in GRI. Press Release, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
Corporate Sustainability Reporting Guidelines Set New Standard for Transparency
(July 11, 2000), available at http://www.grida.no/news/press/2094.aspx. We place such
schemes higher in Zone 6.
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stakeholder structure reinforces their independence from any single
actor group. A few Zone 4 schemes involve modest IGO efforts to
promote socially responsible firm behavior, thus partially resembling
the New Governance ideal type. 20 2 The UNGC promotes normative
learning, disclosure, and business-NGO interactions.
The IFC
provided "extensive advice and guidance" to banks drafting the
Equator Principles, which follow IFC rules. 20 3 However, because
schemes like UNGC are voluntary, are supervised by weak IGOs, and
provide limited roles for countervailing interests, NGOs doubt their
independence and fear they "bluewash" unsatisfactory conduct. 20 4 In
Zone 5, UNEP and the UNGC similarly promote socially responsible
behavior by institutional investors through the PRI, but beyond this
Zone 5 is sparse, as firms strongly resist exclusive state-NGO
regulatory arrangements; most such schemes would in any case lack
business expertise and managerial capacity, although the PRI is an
exception.
Two-actor schemes have further shortcomings.
Bringing
together disparate, often adversarial actors necessarily entails a
degree of mutual suspicion, increasing the costs of bargaining and
compromising. An even greater cost from the New Governance
perspective is that such schemes do not engage the preferences and
capacities of all relevant actors. Zone 7 schemes, which include all
three actor groups, would seem best able to assemble all essential
competencies and a range of motives approximating the public
interest. 20 5 Yet in a context of weak orchestration, bargaining costs
and suspicion make this area quite sparse, especially since some Zone
7 schemes are either temporary (e.g., AIP) or relatively weak (e.g.,
EITI and VPSHR).

202.
These schemes involve a range of orchestration approaches. As an IGO
initiative, UNGC would appear suitable for directive orchestration, but in fact
concentrates on facilitating learning. The IFC facilitated action by banks drafting the
EQP, but may have been implicitly more directive. Collaborative schemes like TOI
involve complex and subtle forms of orchestration. ISO, made up of private and
governmental standard-setting bodies, has involved little directive orchestration
beyond its founding. However, although ISO even now bills itself as an NGO, it retains
strong links to governments through member state agencies and works closely with
IGOs such as the WTO; its standards are sometimes reinforced by incorporation in
treaties and national statutes.
203.
Press Release, The Equator Principles, Leading Banks Announce Adoption
of Equator Principles (June 4, 2003), available at http://www.equator-principles.com
pr030604.shtml.
204.
NGOs express similar concerns about the broader engagement of UN
agencies with business, such as the encouragement of public-private partnerships at
the Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable Development. See generally Kenneth
W. Abbott, Public Private Partnership,in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L.,
http://www.mpepil.com/.
205.
Even successful RSS initiatives suggest the importance of involving all
three actor groups. Cragg, supra note 3, at 224-25.
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Multiplicity

The large number of RSS schemes within the Transnational New
Governance system engages another key strength of New
Governance-the ability to address regulatory issues in multiple and
diverse ways, including through complementary interactions with Old
Governance. Again, consider worker rights in Southern apparel
industries, which are only imperfectly protected by the ILO and by
states. Transnational New Governance offers an additional array of
RSS schemes to address the issue: IGO initiatives, firm and industry
codes regulating foreign suppliers, and NGO and multi-stakeholder
institutions.
Private schemes have also introduced varied and
innovative techniques, including certifying plants, products, and
firms; external monitoring; product labels and logos; and social and
environmental reporting.
Because RSS supplements rather than displaces treaties, IGO
rules, and state regulation, the cumulative effect of Transnational
New Governance and international Old Governance exceeds that of
Old Governance alone. RSS schemes act as force multipliers for
international regulation: they apply mechanisms such as private
certification and labeling in support of international norms,
amplifying the impact of the state-centric mechanisms of Old
Furthermore, many RSS schemes fill gaps in
Governance.
international regulation: their implementation and technical
assistance programs address actors, issues, sectors, and regions
where Old Governance has limited impact, and their norms are
sometimes more extensive or demanding than Old Governance rules,
as by requiring payment of a living wage.
However, multiplicity can also undermine Transnational New
Governance, both by increasing costs for firms and by creating
opportunities for them to subvert it. Firms pressured to adhere to
multiple RSS schemes face heightened transaction, implementation,
and organizational costs. Suppliers in highly visible sectors, for
example, may face downstream firms demanding compliance with
their own unique standards, as well as one or more industry, multistakeholder, or NGO schemes. For small-scale businesses and
farmers in developing countries, these costs are especially intense,
posing significant barriers to participation. 20 6 Of equal significance,
firms that face multiple schemes of different degrees of stringency
can "shop" for the most business-friendly among them, creating
incentives for competing schemes to relax their standards.

206.
See generally Making Sustainability Standards Work for Small-Scale
Farmers: A Pre-UNCTAD XII Event, Apr. 7-9, 2008, http://www.unctad.org/trade-env/
for
and recommendations
(offering conclusions
meeting.asp?MeetingID=249
overcoming such costs).
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Multiplicity can have other adverse effects. Developing country
actors (including governments) opposed to standards they view as
economically harmful or politically inconvenient may use multiplicity
to minimize or evade regulatory standards. Consumers and other
public audiences face high transaction costs and potential confusion
in assessing the relative merits of multiple schemes, which can
undermine their interest and commitment. Thus, multiplicity has
the potential to strengthen regulation, but also to undermine it, at
least in the absence of meaningful orchestration.
We now highlight three more specific benefits of multiplicity.
a.

Facilitating Adaptation

Multiplicity allows RSS standards and procedures to be finetuned to individual circumstances, in contrast to the relative
uniformity of international Old Governance; this is all the more
important in today's diverse global economy. Self-regulatory and
supplier codes are tailored to the circumstances of specific firms or
industries; so too are many NGO and collaborative schemes, such as
FSC, MSC, RUG, RA, WRC, MAC, and IFOAM. Some external
schemes provide even finer variations for specific sectors (e.g., GRI
sector supplements), actors (e.g., FLA requirements for large, small
firms), or regions (e.g., FSC national and regional standards). Many
schemes also rely on input from affected firms, engaged NGOs, and
other actors with superior local information, bringing advantages
akin to those of subsidiarity. 20 7 The advantages of adaptability are
tempered, however, by the possibility that firms may use fine-tuning
to weaken RSS standards.
b.

Promoting Experimentation

Transnational New Governance offers a powerful laboratory for
regulatory experimentation, although strong decentralization makes
it a somewhat different laboratory than domestic New Governance.
Indeed, because low costs of entry and the flexibility of soft law allow
private actors to create RSS schemes with relative ease,
Transnational New Governance may produce even greater
20 8
experimentation than domestic New Governance.
Decentralization offers opportunities for learning across
schemes. Business groups and consultants disseminate lessons of
successful self-regulation among firms. "Norm entrepreneurs" learn

207.
See supra note 166.
208.
Low entry costs may facilitate the appearance
schemes, both pro- and anti-business.

of relatively extreme
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from other schemes, even borrowing entire templates, such as the
"fair trade" and "stewardship council" models, for new industries.
ISEAL and other alliances promote learning and harmonization
among like-minded schemes and provide technical assistance to new
ones. Mutual learning occurs through formal collaborations and
other interactions: for example, NGOs consult with firms in
formulating standards (e.g., GSULL and TCO); firms contract with
NGOs for external monitoring; firms study and participate in NGO
schemes (e.g., CERES); and UNGC sponsors learning forums and
encourages firms to engage with NGOs. 20 9 Even institutions that
vigorously compete for public and industry support observe, learn
from, and borrow from one another. 2 10 In effect, competing schemes
co-evolve through continuous interaction. In forestry, for example,
NGO and industry schemes are converging on common procedures in
211
areas such as stakeholder input and external monitoring.
Governments also learn from RSS experiments, improving public
212
regulation.
However, these benefits are diminished by the absence of any
centralized agency in Transnational New Governance to promote
learning and consolidate the lessons of experimentation, a significant
failing given the sheer range of experimentation in Transnational
New Governance.
A central agent such as the state is better
positioned to assess regulatory experiments systematically and to
publicize and scale up the most successful. As it stands, the diffusion
of successful approaches in Transnational New Governance depends
largely on demonstration effects-the willingness and ability of
schemes to learn from one another-and on competition, discussed
further below.
c.

Avoiding Capture

Multiplicity in Transnational New Governance helps protect the
international regulatory system against capture, which would
otherwise be a significant danger of granting enhanced authority to
the targets of regulation. 213
The multiplicity of regulatory
institutions diminishes the risk of capture: if one institution is
captured, the activities of other schemes can compensate for it. Even

209.
Sahlin-Andersson, supranote 123, at 140-41.
210.
Such interactions facilitate accountability in a non-hierarchical regulatory
system. Kingsbury et al., supra note 16, at 58-59.
211.
Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia, supra note 30, at 129.
212.
Meidinger, Environmental Law-Making, supra note 31, at 315; Meidinger,
Competitive SupragovernmentalRegulation, supra note 23, at 519-20.
213.
Because of this access, NGOs wary of capture are often suspicious of New
Governance programs. Kollman & Prakash, supra note 73, at 417. NGOs can also
capture regulation.
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if an IGO or state agency is captured, private RSS schemes retain
substantial regulatory independence. Moreover, Transnational New
Governance relies heavily on soft law. As a result, regulatory capture
neither places the full coercive power of the state behind the resulting
distortive measures, as it does under Old Governance, nor allows the
captured institution to trump other schemes. These protections are
reinforced by the intense competition for legitimacy and public
support among RSS schemes; if one institution were captured, its
214
competitors would quickly reveal and criticize that fact.
Countervailing interests within multi-stakeholder schemes also
limit capture. In a Zone 6 scheme, for example, NGO or union
participants resist capture by firms, and vice versa; if either group
begins to succeed, the other can easily exit, challenge the legitimacy
of the scheme, and even establish a competitor. 215 Public actors can
play similar roles in Zone 4, 5, and 7 schemes. Multi-stakeholder
composition also makes collaborative schemes relatively transparent,
216
allowing interested outsiders to monitor their internal politics.
3.

Participation and Engagement

Transnational New Governance has created new avenues of
participation for many diverse groups and actors: NGOs, firms and
their employees; unions (WRC); universities (FLA, WIRC); socially
responsible investors (CERES, PRI); organic and small farmers
(IFOAM, FLO, FTO); indigenous groups and forest owners (FSC); and
scientists, advocates, and concerned individuals. Participation allows
these individuals and groups to engage directly with regulatory
issues and exercise greater influence on their own futures and the
futures of those they seek to help. Such engagement is both an

214.
This effect can be seen in the mutual criticism between NGO and Firm
schemes, both of which are "captured" by design.
215.
E.g., Kingsbury et al., supra note 16, at 59. The history of FLA reflects a
similar dynamic: aggressive unions and NGOs left the FLA and created WRC, while
conservative firms left and formed WRAP. NGO or business participants might be coopted by the other so they would not resist capture, but some protection is still offered
by the multiplicity of competing schemes and the ease of creating new ones.
216.
RSS schemes are not subject to legal transparency requirements found in
advanced democratic states, such as open meeting and freedom of information laws,
but a number of private multi-stakeholder schemes have begun to develop analogous
procedures. The ISEAL Code of Good Practice details extensive transparency
requirements, including procedures for notice to and comment by interested parties
during standard-setting. See ISEAL CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR SETTING SOCIAL AND

ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS art. 5 (Public Version 4, Jan. 2006), available at
http://www.isealalliance.org/document/docWindow.cfm?fuseaction=document.viewDocu
ment&documentid=212&documentFormatId=1289 [hereinafter ISEAL CODE OF GOOD
PRACTICE].
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independent good and more empowering than the typical Old
2 17
Governance roles as lobbyists and objects of regulation.
Evaluating the social or collective benefits of Transnational New
Governance engagement is more difficult.
Broad participation
arguably renders Transnational New Governance more democratic,
enhancing its legitimacy as a regulatory system. However, this claim
has been called "the most vexing normative implication" of New
Governance, 218 in part because participation is rarely representative
in the ways liberal democratic theory calls for. 219 Deliberative theory
provides an alternative rationale, although there is no consensus on
what constitutes adequate participation and deliberation. Even with
"convincing democratic theories for the global sphere ... lacking, ' 22 0
many collaborative RSS schemes have developed structures and
procedures that pragmatically further both representative and
deliberative democracy. Perhaps the best example is the FSC, which
incorporates representatives of virtually all sustainable forestry
stakeholder groups and reaches decisions through deliberations
within and among distinct environmental, social, and economic
"chambers," each with Northern and Southern components. 221 Other
schemes have adopted stakeholder advisory councils, public comment
procedures, and other means to promote transparency, participation,
and deliberation.
Even in labor rights, where direct roles in
governance have long been extended-and confined-to workers and
employers, these arrangements render the global regime more
participatory.
Pragmatic steps like these constitute sensible
approaches to developing democracy in an arena where the very

217.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 158-62 (discussing delegation
and participation in a responsive regulatory order). Blackett, supra note 88, at 125-27,
argues that labor law promotes worker agency through participation, whereas many
worker rights schemes deemphasize freedom of association and other participatory
issues in favor of visible issues such as child labor.
218.
Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia, supra note 30, at 140, argues that
theoretical examination of the democratic implications of New Governance is "a
conceptual hodgepodge."
219.
More broadly, while Western states, at least, agree on liberal democracy as
the appropriate framework for national regulation, there is no equivalent consensus on
appropriate transnational governance. Cragg, supranote 3, at 214.
220.
Kingsbury et al., supra note 16, at 49.
221.
Klaus Dingwerth, North-South Parity in Global Governance: The
Affirmative Proceduresof the Forest Stewardship Council, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 53,

56-58 (2008); Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public
Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 47, 53 (2006); Meidinger,
Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation, supra note 23, at 523. At the time of this
Article's publication, FSC is considering changes to its internal governance. See
FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC GOVERNANCE REVIEW PROCESS: FINAL PROPOSALS

(2008), available at http://www.fsc.org/fileadmin/web.datalpublic/documentcenter!
institutionaldocuments/FSCGovernancePaper 2008.pdf (presenting proposals for
changes to FSC governance system).

556

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:.501

meaning of the concept is in doubt; 222 over time, they could have
Finally,
for global democracy. 223
significant consequences
deliberative
is
implicitly
a
whole
as
New
Governance
Transnational
in a different sense, as RSS schemes learn from one another, compete,
224
bargain, and collaborate.
Yet Transnational New Governance still falls short of liberal and
deliberative democratic ideals. Liberal critics argue that democratic
states are the sole legitimate regulators; 225 only they grant each
citizen an equal electoral voice and establish clear standards and
From this
procedures for representation and accountability.
perspective, RSS can be seen as bypassing and weakening democratic
decision making. 226 Even from a less purist perspective, the quality
of participation and deliberation in Transnational New Governance
remains uneven. Firm schemes are limited to economic stakeholders
and are not highly deliberative, although a few schemes do
incorporate significant input from other groups. Other schemes vary
widely in engaging those ultimately affected by regulatory decisions,
such as developing country workers, rather than elite groups that
claim to speak for them. For example, decisions in CERES are made
by representatives of international NGOs, socially responsible
investors, and other elite groups; in contrast, WRC includes Southern
worker representatives on its board, gathers information from
workers, and involves workers in monitoring. In general, even
though many RSS schemes make an effort to include Southern voices,
most are dominated by Northern elites. 227
Disparities in participation reflect a deeper collective action
problem: social groups possess highly uneven capacities for
skewing
systematically
action,
and collective
organization

For example, these developments are consistent with de Birca's proposal
222.
for making transnational governance democratically legitimate: begin with an effort to
enhance the participation and representation of those affected, and "strive" for greater
democracy over time. Grdinne de Birca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 221, 227 (2008).

See Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J.
223.
INT'L L. & POL. 763, 766 (2005) (speculating that the development of new accountability
mechanisms for institutions of "global politics," including IGO and other public
regulation as well as Transnational New Governance, could over time democratize
global governance by developing the necessary global "demos" and public sphere).
Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation, supra note 23, at
224.
531 (describing competition for public acceptance as the "hidden democratic genius" of
RSS).
225. " E.g., John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 205, 221 (2000) (arguing that many forms of global governance, including
expanded civil society participation, undercut national democratic procedures).
Id. at 212-13. These critics level the same objections at IGOs that allow
226.
civil society participation.
227.
Klaus Dingwerth, Private Transnational Governance and the Developing
World: A ComparativePerspective, 52 INT'L STUD. Q. 607, 622-25 (2008).
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participation. As operating entities, firms begin with a significant
organizational advantage; they also place a high priority on
influencing regulation.
Industry groupings are relatively
concentrated, are often organized in associations, and, like firms, can
devote significant resources to lobbying and self-regulation. 228 By
contrast, social and environmental activists face problems of
22 9
organization, although some can piggyback on preexisting NGOs.
Once formed, activist groups benefit from intense member support
and often attract significant resources, even if they are rarely equal to
those of business. However, because norm entrepreneurs initiate
most NGO schemes, and because those schemes depend on support
from public audiences, the concerns of affluent, well-organized, and
vocal advocates and constituencies strongly influence the priorities of
Transnational New Governance, perhaps at the expense of less
influential groups and issues of equal social value. 230 Groups such as
consumers and agricultural workers in developing countries, for
example, have diffuse interests and few organizational resources;
their voices are less likely to be reflected in RSS.
Although deficient compared to the New Governance ideal,
Transnational New Governance nevertheless represents a substantial
overall improvement in the quality of transnational participation. In
evaluating Transnational New Governance,
the appropriate
counterfactual is not hypothetical representative democracy or "ideal
speech" deliberation, 23 1 but the prevailing regulatory setting. Many
states involved in worker rights, environmental, and human rights
issues are not democratic, but authoritarian and corrupt. Even in
democracies, elite groups and leaders, not ordinary individuals,
dominate politics; collective action problems pervasively influence
interest group competition, even in Old Governance.
The comparative participatory advantages of Transnational New
Governance are magnified by the nature of transnational issues.
Decisions by a single state, even if democratic, cannot take account of

228.
A strong industry association helped U.S. forestry companies overcome
collective action problems and create SFI as a competitor to FSC. Sasser et al., supra
note 2, at 9.
229.
For example, the business unit of Amnesty International UK drew on the
resources of the larger organization to propose human rights standards for business,
and WRC was created by United Students Against Sweatshops, an established NGO.
230.
A possible example is organic food, which is less important to poor
Southern consumers than to affluent Northern advocates. Graham & Woods, supra
note 111, at 873.
231.
In an ideal speech situation, a concept introduced by Habermas,
participants come together on equal terms in pursuit of a rational consensus based on
free deliberation and offering reasons, without being confounded by asymmetries of
power, information, rhetoric, or strategic action. See Richard Harvey Brown & Douglas
Goodman, Jirgen Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action: An Incomplete Project,
in HANDBOOK OF SociAL THEORY 201, 206 (George Ritzer & Barry Smart eds., 2001)
(discussing ideal speech situations).
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interests that are widely distributed internationally; independent
decisions by multiple states reflecting national interests may be
inconsistent. In this situation, moving regulatory decision making to
a broader arena, such as an IGO, may produce more representative
decisions. IGOs, however, are often dominated by powerful states,
and their claims to democratic legitimacy depend in turn on the
23 2
democratic quality of their member states, which varies widely.
Even with its many problems, then, Transnational New Governance
enhances transnational civic engagement, participation, and voice.
B. Orchestration
1.

The International Orchestration Deficit

In principle, Transnational New Governance is well suited to
international regulation, but it faces a fundamental dilemma. As
Braithwaite argues with respect to developing countries, the agents of
international Old Governance-states and IGOs-lack essential
competencies for regulation; successful New Governance could
produce superior outcomes at lower cost. 23 3 Yet New Governance is
premised on state orchestration and support of private regulatory
actors, whereas the international system lacks a central "state" to
The resulting
provide equivalent steering and assistance. 23 4
greatest
Governance's
orchestration deficit is Transnational New
serious
most
its
type
and
divergence from the New Governance ideal
limitation.
Greater orchestration could enhance the impact, legitimacy, and
It could prescribe
public interest orientation of RSS schemes.
public law to
from
derived
substantive principles and procedures
the
legitimacy
reinforce transparency and accountability, enhancing
of private schemes. It could add the imprimatur of the state to
schemes that meet such requirements. Orchestration could modulate
the composition, structure, and procedures of private schemes to
maximize their participatory and deliberative character and public
interest orientation. It could empower weaker and more diffuse
groups in internal decision making, assist them in participating, and

Many IGOs have broadened societal participation in response to democratic
232.
deficit concerns and other rationales of New Governance. See, e.g., One World Trust,
IGO Initiatives, http://www.oneworldtrust.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=
article&id=88&Itemid=86 (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (discussing IGOs in terms of
accountability and civil society participation).
Braithwaite, supranote 35, at 891-94.
233.
IGOs and states provide limited directive and facilitative orchestration, but
234.
currently at modest levels.
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act on their behalf where necessary. 23 5
Promoting broad
participation and a rough balance of power among countervailing
interests, along with transparency, would also reduce the risk of
236
capture.
Greater orchestration could also strengthen Transnational New
Governance as a system. Orchestration could help to rectify the
uneven and suboptimal distribution of RSS schemes, including the
disproportionate number of single-actor schemes and the absence of
potentially valuable alternatives. It could reduce the bargaining
problems that hamper collaboration by initiating desirable regulatory
arrangements, convening public and private actors, and facilitating
the formation and operation of private institutions. 237 Orchestration
could also ameliorate excessive multiplicity by endorsing, and thereby
increasing, the legitimacy of, effective RSS schemes, as well as by
encouraging uniformity of standards across competing schemes; this
would reduce forum-shopping and adverse competition, as well as the
costs of adherence for firms and other private actors. 238 It could more
systematically encourage learning across
the system and
disseminate, replicate, and scale up the most successful innovations.
Many RSS schemes already recognize the value of connections to
state institutions. Many incorporate international law rules as the
heart of their standards. Virtually all labor rights schemes, for

235.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 59 (state can give weaker parties
decision-making power and resources to use it effectively).
236.
This is consistent with Ayres and Braithwaite's recommendation for
"tripartism" in decentralized regulation; because diffuse publics cannot offset organized
economic interests, schemes must incorporate organized countervailing interests. Id. at
81-84; cf. Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Countervailing Power in Empowered
ParticipatoryGovernance, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE, supra note 81, at 259, 259 (arguing it is not

enough to merely promote broad participation; "problems of powerlessness and
domination" must also be considered).
237.
Cases in which states and NGOs have played such roles include AIP and
EITI. See Herman, supra note 186 (discussing development of AAIP); Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), EITI Summary, http://eitransparency.org
eiti/summary (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (discussing EITI goals).
238.
One way to reduce the costs of multiplicity is to encourage mutual
recognition and equivalency determinations by public and private schemes. In 2003,
UNCTAD, FAO, and IFOAM formed the International Task Force on Harmonization
and Equivalence in Organic Agriculture (ITF) to pursue this approach in that area.
International Task Force for Harmonization and Equivalence in Organic Agriculture,
http://www.itf-organic.org/brief.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). In 2008, the Task
Force introduced tools for recognizing organic certification bodies and the equivalency
of organic production and processing standards. See UNEP-UNCTAD CAPACITY
BUILDING TASK FORCE ON TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, BEST PRACTICES
FOR ORGANIC POLICY: WHAT DEVELOPING COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS CAN DO TO
PROMOTE THE ORGANIC AGRICULTURE SECTOR 17-21, UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2007/3

(2008), available at http://www.unep.chetb/publications/UNCTADDITC TED_2007
3.pdf.
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example, echo core ILO principles.23 9 Many collaborative schemes
also follow governance procedures consistent with due process, public
participation, and other public law principles.2 40 Yet these moves are
voluntary, decentralized, and uneven. The New Governance model
suggests that a modest strengthening of orchestration could
significantly improve the performance of Transnational New
Governance. Orchestration would also provide opportunities for IGOs
and states to enhance the transnational impact of their operations.
Part VI discusses these possibilities.
2.

Reliance on Voluntary Action by Firms and Public Audiences

In the absence of state authority and orchestration,
Transnational New Governance must currently rely on voluntary
actions by firms, which decide whether to adhere to and comply with
RSS standards, and by consumers and other commercial and public
audiences, which provide the incentives, both "carrots" and "sticks,"
In the transnational context, these are
for firms to act.241
unsatisfactory bases for regulatory action.
The most common form of voluntary adherence by firms is selfregulation; external schemes must convince firms to adopt their
usually more stringent standards. In either case, most profit-oriented
firms make their decisions by comparing anticipated costs and
benefits.2 42 Some perceive significant commercial advantages from
participation: premium prices, access to "ethical markets" and highstandards customers, improved brand loyalty, employee recruitment
2 43
and morale, and a continuing "social license to operate."
Conversely, reliance on brand reputation makes firms vulnerable to

See, e.g., SAI, Overview of SA8000, http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseact
239.
ion=Page.viewPage&pageId=473 (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
The ISEAL Code of Good Practice has accelerated this process. See ISEAL
240.
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 216. The ISEAL Code itself follows public norms
in the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, as well as ISO standards.
ISEAL CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE, supranote 216, intro.
For this reason, Cashore, Auld, and Newsom call such regulation "non-state
241.
market-driven." CASHORE, ET AL., supra note 17, at 4.
Id. at 237; see also Wood, supra note 15, at 249-52 (analyzing anticipated
242.
benefits and costs for businesses). Gunningham and Sinclair observe that local culture
shapes the effectiveness of approaches such as self-regulation; firms in an adversarial
society like the U.S. may be more cost-benefit oriented than in Europe. Gunningham &
Sinclair, supra note 31, at 52. However, firms in competitive markets face competitive
constraints regardless of local culture.
See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection:
243.
Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 308-10 (2004);
see CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 23 (providing additional commercial advantage
from participation: favorable evaluations from non-state governance systems).

2009]

STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

pressure from consumers, employees, investors, 244 and the public,
and sometimes to boycotts or legal proceedings. 245 Downstream firms
can provide strong incentives by conditioning purchases on suppliers'
adherence to their own or external standards; such requirements are
246
increasingly common among large firms in many industries.
Indeed, much of the transnational impact of RSS, especially in
business-to-business sectors,2 47 has resulted from pressure on
vulnerable downstream firms (e.g., branded retailers) to induce them
2 48
to require foreign suppliers to accept external standards.
Ayres and Braithwaite observe that commercial and public
audiences could replace the state in "responsive regulation" if they
could reliably respond to firm misfeasance. 249 However, reliance on
such audiences poses major challenges for Transnational New
Governance, even as compared to domestic New Governance.
Consumers and other audiences may favor or oppose certain
behaviors once recognized, but they are often poorly informed about
transnational business (whose productive activities and effects occur
in far-off locations) and confused by multiple opaque schemes and
standards.
Moreover, consumer values are frequently latent,
especially for issues that are geographically, culturally, and
psychologically remote. Audiences must be informed and "activated"

244.
Pressure comes from both socially responsible investors and economic
investors seeking to avoid catastrophic risks like Bhopal. See Blair et al., supra note
28, at 9-10. Even the UN-sponsored Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) are
based on the assumption that environmental, social, and corporate governance issues
can affect the performance of investment portfolios. Principles for Responsible
Investment, About, http://www.unpri.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
245.
Graham & Woods, supra note 111, at 872-73, 877 (discussing consumer
boycotts and legal proceedings).
246.
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private
Contractingin Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 922-25 (2007). Vandenbergh
examined publicly disclosed policies and supply contracts for the largest firms in eight
sectors; over half of the firms, typically the largest, impose some environmental
standards on suppliers. Id. at 917. Other interfirm contracts, such as acquisition,
credit, and insurance agreements, can also contain such standards. Id. at 925. WalMart has recently announced such higher standards for suppliers. See supra note 10.
247.
CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 238-39 (noting that in business-tobusiness markets, where individual consumers cannot express their preferences
directly, advocates must focus pressure on downstream firms). For example, consumers
rarely have opportunities to select FSC-certified wood over competing lumber. Id. at
239.
248.
Erika N. Sasser, Gaining Leverage: NGO Influence on Certification
Institutions in the Forest Products Sector, in FOREST POLICY FOR PRIVATE FORESTRY:
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES 229, 236-37 (Lawrence W. Teeter, Benjamin
Cashore & Dao Zhang eds., 2003); cf. Misty L. Archambault, Note, Making the Brand:
Using Brand Management to Encourage Market Acceptance of Forestry Certification,81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1400, 1400 (2006) (arguing that this approach has had limited effect in
the U.S. and suggesting marketing strategies to stimulate consumer demand for
certified products).
249.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 158-61.
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to serve as demandeurs and sanctioners for RSS; 250 to do so,
advocates and schemes must establish legitimacy in the eyes of these
audiences. 2 51 In addition, many consumers cannot or will not pay
premiums for high-standards products. 25 2 Public audiences often
have short attention spans and quickly redirect their interest to new
issues. Organized actions, such as boycotts, depend on sustained
collective action by highly diffuse groups.
As a result, firms' reliance on cost-benefit calculations
significantly limits the regulatory potential of Transnational New
Governance; for most firms, the costs of participation outweigh the
perceived benefits. For a RSS scheme to promote strict standards, it
must modify firms' calculations by providing economic carrotsmarket or reputational benefits for adherents-or sticks-costs for
non-adherents. 253 However, because both carrots and sticks depend
on the actions of consumers and other audiences, they are uncertain
Business groups such as Business for Social
and variable.
Responsibility, RSS schemes such as UNGC, and other advocates
promote corporate social responsibility in the hope of muting the
dominance of cost-benefit calculations, or at least revealing
additional benefits. By most independent accounts, however, this is a
254
long-term prospect at best.
Sticks, such as consumer boycotts or terminations of supplier
contracts, are also costly to use and can have perverse
consequences. 2 55 Applied by a labor rights scheme, for example, they
may harm the very workers the scheme aims to benefit. Sticks also
strengthen incentives for firms to seek more flexible standards by
"forum shopping" among multiple schemes or creating alternative
256
self-regulatory schemes to defuse consumer and public pressure.
In turn, these options create pressure on external schemes to relax
their standards. While Transnational New Governance advocates

Abbott & Snidal, Values, supra note 164, at 146-50.
250.
251.
Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 42, at 33-35. Competencies such as
independence, normative expertise, and representativeness are central to the quest for
legitimacy. Black, supra note 30, at 76.
Accord Levi & Linton, supra note 167, at 415 ("Approximately 80 percent of
252.
U.S. coffee consumers drink canned coffee. They are indifferent to quality and sensitive
to price.") (footnote omitted).
CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 4, 237.
253.
See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 8, at 10-13 (assessing likely impact of
254.
corporate social responsibility and the "market for virtue").
Similar issues arise with enforcement actions. PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra
255.
note 7, at 22-23.
256.
Some scholars argue that aggressive NGO targeting of forestry firms
created a "confrontational atmosphere" that led firms to create the SF1 industry
scheme rather than adhere to FSC. Sasser et al., supra note 2, at 3. This strategy
depends on the inability of audiences to distinguish more or less stringent regulation.
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hope that RSS standards will be "ratcheted up" 257 over time through
competition for legitimacy and public support, as has occurred in
certain sectors, 258 these schemes also face strong incentives to
"ratchet down" their standards. 259
Similarly, it is difficult for external schemes to appeal
simultaneously to public audiences and to target firms. A scheme
that sets strict standards to match the moral commitments of its core
supporters may draw few business adherents; 260 in turn, the scheme's
small size will limit the reputational benefits it can offer to attract
additional firms. 261 Conversely, if a scheme adopts business-friendly
standards to attract adherents, it may lose legitimacy among
concerned audiences. Similar problems arise when RSS schemes seek
resources. Firms typically control the greatest resources, which
schemes tap through dues, certification fees, and the like. Relying on
business support, however, may damage credibility with committed
audiences. Public contributions, on the other hand, are uncertain and
difficult to acquire. Most RSS schemes survive, albeit modestly,
through varying combinations of business and public sources, as well
as similarly unreliable foundation 262 and government grants.
Thus, in some cases, competition for legitimacy and audience
support leads regulatory standard-setting schemes to strengthen
their standards; in other cases, competition for adherents leads
schemes to relax them. Still other cases are mixed: in forestry,
industry schemes formed to compete with FSC have strengthened
certain standards, while FSC has relaxed some to accommodate
business concerns. 26 3 The outcomes of such cross-cutting competition
264
are extremely difficult to predict.

257.
Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, supra note 98, at 4, propose a structured
ratcheting-up process based on disclosure and ratings by independent monitors, fueling
competition for responsible reputations.
258.
Examples include competing forestry and worker rights/apparel schemes.
259.
CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 8 (stating that "efforts to gain forest
company and landowner support may result in the FSC certification program reducing
the stringency of its rules") (emphasis added); Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia, supra
note 30, at 127 (stating that the FSC has made concessions "to make its programme
more workable in the face of market challenges").
260.
CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 240-43 (explaining how the moral
legitimacy of core supporters affects support from other institutional groups).
261.
PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 56-57.
262.
Foundations have supported some RSS schemes, notably FSC. Tim Bartley,
How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The Construction of an Organizational
Field and the Rise of Forest Certification,43 SOC. PROBS. 229 (2007).
263.
CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 8.
264.
Id. at 8-9 ("[W]e cannot predict ....
"); Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia,
supra note 30, at 140-41 (describing this issue as "the thorny problem of democracy").
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THE POTENTIAL OF TRANSNATIONAL NEW GOVERNANCE

A. Overcoming the OrchestrationDeficit
The emergence of Transnational New Governance is a significant
and potentially transformative development in international
regulation.
Yet the current orchestration deficit prevents
Transnational New Governance from realizing its full potential.
While Transnational New Governance may never match the New
Governance ideal, states and IGOs can substantially strengthen it
through expanded orchestration. Although the tools of transnational
orchestration are less powerful than those available domestically,
even modest forms of support and steering can enhance
Transnational New Governance's effectiveness and contribution to
the global public interest.
Transnational New Governance is equally a boon for states and
IGOs supportive of transnational regulation. Orchestration offers a
way to attain transnational regulatory goals that are not achievable
through domestic or international Old Governance.
For states,
orchestration requires less extensive involvement than does
international Old Governance, demands fewer capacities and
resources, and avoids the legal and political snares of extraterritorial
regulation. Support for and engagement with RSS schemes allow
individual government agencies (e.g., environment ministries or
economic development agencies) and subnational units (e.g., federal
states or regions) to enhance their transnational impact without the
need for time-consuming, high-level political approval. Orchestration
also entails more limited delegations of authority than does effective
Old Governance. For IGOs, orchestration offers ways to achieve their
regulatory aims that are within their capacities and that generate
less state opposition than does international OG.
In sum,
Transnational New Governance provides the most viable route to
improving the international regulatory system.
To be sure, not all states and IGOs will wish to strengthen
Transnational New Governance.
Developed states have limited
incentives to incur national costs to improve social and environmental
conditions abroad. They may also face domestic resistance from
powerful firms, and at least implicit resistance from consumers
seeking cheaper goods, that will overwhelm other societal pressures
that favor regulation. 265
To the extent Transnational New
Governance is promoted by Northern states and NGOs, developing

265.
That is, state support for Transnational New Governance is constrained by
the limits to the New Governance and Old Governance models as previously discussed.
See discussion supra Part III.
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country actors may oppose it as a form of cultural imperialism
imposing inappropriate First World standards or as disguised
protectionism. 266 IGOs may be constrained by influential member
states, and some may fear that Transnational New Governance will
displace them from their rightful roles. Nevertheless, many states,
state agencies, and IGOs already support RSS schemes. Given the
benefits of Transnational New Governance just described, this
support should grow over time.
This Part identifies potential methods of orchestration for states
and IGOs. 26 7 We organize our discussion around the categories of
orchestration introduced above: directive, the closest to the New
Governance ideal, especially in domestic settings, where the state has
substantial capacity for mandatory action; and facilitative, which is
far more feasible in the international system, where state capacity is
limited. Of course, these categories are not distinct, but blend into
one another, especially in the collaborative relationships in the
middle tier of the Governance Triangle.
We draw on existing
examples but extrapolate from them based on New Governance
theory. Similarly, our approach is both positive and normative: we
discuss techniques already in limited use, and suggest what more
states and IGOs might do to enhance Transnational New
Governance.
B. Directive Orchestration
1. States
States have the authority and capacity for directive orchestration
and exercise them on occasion.2 68 To further support Transnational
New Governance, states can extend a major domestic New
Governance approach to the international plane by relaxing legal and
administrative requirements for firms that adhere to approved
transnational RSS schemes and require adherence by their suppliers.
(This benefits the state as well, allowing it to focus limited
enforcement resources on nonparticipating firms.) Developed states
can also sponsor RSS schemes, such as EMS and eco-label schemes,
that apply to national firms' foreign operations and suppliers. States
can scale up successful approaches by mandating other schemes to
adopt equivalent techniques or by incorporating them into

266.
For example, U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich's proposal for an ILO
social label died because of charges of protectionism. Bartley, supra note 2, at 331.
267.
This discussion overlaps, but does not exactly follow, the typology of publicprivate interactions defined in Wood, supra note 68, at 131.
268.
See CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 243-44; Meidinger, Environmental
Law-Making, supra note 31, at 315-16; Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia, supra note 30,
at 130-32.
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government programs. Some forms of directive involvement may,
however, risk subjecting private standards to the constraints of WTO
law, e.g., as a "law, regulation or requirement" under GATT Article
111.269

To further steer RSS, states can mandate baseline substantive
principles, operational procedures, and other institutional parameters
for schemes subject to their jurisdiction, particularly for single-actor
schemes whose independence and representativeness are limited.
States can similarly regulate the auditing firms and other actors that
monitor firm compliance with RSS schemes.2 70 A background threat
of mandatory regulation creates an incentive for firms, schemes, and
monitors to adopt appropriate principles and procedures.
Credible threats of regulation are more difficult in the
transnational context because of the significant legal and practical
limits on extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction.2 71 States can avoid
many of these constraints by adopting domestic requirements that
"exert subtler regulatory pressures ... in relation to. . . foreign social
and environmental performance, short of actually prescribing and
enforcing standards. ''272 For example, rather than directly regulating

269.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at httpJ/www.wto.orgenglis/docs.e/legaLegatt47_01_e.htm.
This is not to say that such requirements necessarily violate WTO law or qualify as
exceptions under GATT Article XX. See POTTS, supra note 175, at 18. Developing
countries have raised questions under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) about the trade-restrictive nature of private
RSS standards related to food safety and quality, such as SQF and Global GAP, apart
from any governmental involvement. STDF Information Session on Private Standards,
http://www.wto.org/englishltratop-e/sps-e/private-standardsjuneO8-e/private-standar
dsjune08_e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); see Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures pmbl., Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-ellegal-e/15.
sps.pdf. In October 2008 the SPS Committee authorized a study of the trade effects of
such standards. Press Release, World Trade Organization, Think Development? Think
Fruit-Fly, Committee Hears (Oct. 8-9, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/englishl
newse/newsO8_e/sps_10octO8_e.htm. For further background on this decision, see
World Trade Organization, Private Standards-Identifying PracticalActions for the
SPS Committee-Summary of Responses: Note by the Secretariat,G/SPS/W/230 (Sept.
25, 2008); World Trade Organization, Private Standardsand the SPS Agreement: Note
by the Secretariat, G/SPSIGEN/746 (Jan. 24, 2007).
270.
Murphy, supra note 27, at 431. Many groups monitoring compliance with
RSS schemes began as inspectors of goods in international trade; their role is largely
unregulated by the state, although many schemes accredit monitors. Blair et al., supra
note 28, at 4. For a critique of external monitoring by auditing firms, see Dara
O'Rourke, Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of Corporate Third-Party Labor
Monitoring, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOR RIGHTS: CODES OF CONDUCT IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 196 (R. Jenkins et al. eds., 2002).
271.
JENNIFER A.
ZERK,
MULTINATIONALS
AND
CORPORATE
SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 104-42 (2006).
272.
Id. at 134.
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the foreign conduct of national firms, a state can influence such
conduct by imposing reasonable duties on home-based parent
companies, directors, and executives, monitoring such requirements
through regular supervision procedures or newly mandated corporate
reports.
To be sure, directive orchestration by individual states runs the
risk of fostering confusion, increasing costs, and creating outright
conflicts for transnational firms and RSS schemes. Transparency
requirements
minimize these risks while still influencing
transnational behavior. States can, for example, require disclosures
by national firms regarding social and environmental aspects of their
global operations, including their major suppliers. 273 More extreme
techniques might also be feasible: the state could require national
firms to disclose the conditions under which the products they sell
were made, perhaps with certification by approved RSS schemes.
Transparency requirements empower NGOs and public audiences to
monitor firms and hold them accountable for their reports and
actions. They also enable the state to punish misleading disclosures,
even when the underlying conduct is only discouraged and not itself
unlawful. In a prominent recent example, the California Supreme
Court allowed a civil suit for unfair and deceptive practices to proceed
against Nike, based on Nike's public statements about the working
274
conditions under which its products were manufactured abroad.
Another potentially powerful directive approach is to condition
public benefits for firms, particularly government procurement
opportunities, on satisfying the standards of approved RSS
schemes. 275
There is currently wide international support for

273.
A modest example is the UK Companies Act 2006, § 417, the subject of the
CORE coalition campaign. See discussion supra note 159. This provision requires that
a firm's annual report include a "business review," which for a quoted company must
include information about "environmental matters (including the impact of the
company's business on the environment)" and about "social and community issues"-all
to the extent necessary for understanding the firm's business. Companies Act, 2006,
c. 46, § 417 (Eng.).
274.
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted 539 U.S. 654 (2003). Nike and Kasky settled the case in 2003,
with Nike agreeing to donate $1.5 million to the FLA. Press Release, Nike, Inc., Nike,
Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of Kasky v. Nike First Amendment Case (Sept.
12, 2003), available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/pressrelease-print.jhtml?
year=2003&month=O9&letter=f.
275.
The power of the strategy derives from the size of the public procurement
sector in many countries. In Europe, for example, public authorities spend some 16% of
the GDP of the EU. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BUYING GREEN: A HANDBOOK ON
ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 5 (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/gpp/pdfbuyinggreenhandbook en.pdf [hereinafter BUYING GREEN]. In

developing countries the percentage is often even higher. See, e.g., Rod Falvey et al.,
Competition Policy and Public Procurement in Developing Countries 15 (Centre for
Research in Econ. Dev. & Int'l Trade, Research Paper 08/07, 2008), available at
http://www.nottingham.ac.ukleconomics/credit/research/papers/CP0807.pdf
(stating
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strategies of this kind, especially for "green public procurement"
(GPP). The EU has supported GPP since at least 2001.276 Its
procurement directives enable the approach, 277 and in July 2008 the
Commission proposed a substantial expansion of GPP.2 78 Similarly,
the Plan of Implementation of the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit
on Sustainable Development encourages public authorities at all
levels to consider sustainable development in decision making,
specifically by promoting GPP. 27 9 As part of the Marrakech Process
to implement the results of the Summit, 28 0 the Marrakech Task Force
a plan to promote
on Sustainable Public Procurement has developed
281
sustainable public procurement around the globe.
Procurement strategies raise complex legal issues, however, and
First, most states require public
must be pursued with care.
authorities to maximize value in their purchases, yet they also allow
authorities to define the parameters of procurements. 282 As a result,
may, for example, require bidders to supply
authorities
environmentally sustainable products and then select the best value
among those offered, rather than accepting the lowest bid regardless
of sustainability. 28 3 Second, public authorities must treat potential
bidders fairly, prescribing conditions that are widely accessible and
transparent. 28 4 In practice, this is usually taken to mean that

that Malaysia spends 20.6% of GDP); but see id. (stating that Kenya spends merely
8%).
276.
See Commission Interpretative Communication on the Community Law
Applicable to Public Procurement and the Possibilitiesfor Integrating Environmental
Considerations into Public Procurement, at 6, COM (2002) 274 final (July 4, 2001)
(noting that the Commission intends to produce a handbook on green public
procurement and referencing a 2001 Commission Communication in Integrated
Product Policy).
277.
See Council Directive 2004/18, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114 (EC) (detailing the
"coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply
contracts and public service contracts"); Council Directive 2004/17, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 1
(EC) ("coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water,
energy, transport and postal services sectors").
278.
Communication from the Commission: Public Procurement for a Better
Environment, § 2, COM (2008) 400 final (July 16, 2008).
279.
World Summit on Sustainable Development, Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, Plan of
19, U.N. Doc.
Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,
A/CONF.199/20 (Sept. 4, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documentsl
on
World
Summit
[hereinafter
WSSDPOIPD/EnglishWSSDPlanImpl.pdf
Sustainable Development].
Process,
see
The Marrakech
about this process,
280.
For more
http://esa.un.org/marrakechprocess/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
See United Nations Environment Programme, Marrakech Task Forces,
281.
(last visited Feb. 16,
http://www.unep.fr/scp/marrakech/taskforces/procurement.htm
2009) (detailing plan to promote sustainable procurement).
BUYING GREEN, supra note 275, at 12.
282.
See id.
283.
See id.
284
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authorities may not require certification by a particular RSS scheme;
they may, however, base their specifications on private standards and
accept certification by private schemes as one means of
demonstrating compliance. 28 5 Third, in the EU, public authorities
must ensure that procurement conditions do not discriminate against
bidders from other member countries. 28 6 The WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement applies similar rules to participating
states: procurement specifications and practices may not discriminate
against foreign suppliers or suppliers from particular states,
specifications may not create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade, and contracts must be awarded to the lowest bidder or to the
bidder that "in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forth ... is
determined to be the most advantageous. ''28 7
It also requires
authorities to base their specifications on international standards
288
where they exist.
As noted earlier, many developing countries lack the capacities
for directive action. Even developed states lack the regulatory reach
to direct transnational activities, and individual states are globally
unrepresentative, reducing their legitimacy.
To address these
limitations, developed states might promote RSS through
international agreements, for example, by linking bilateral trade or
investment agreements and related technical assistance to developing
country support for private standards and monitoring. 28 9 However,
this approach again raises issues of power and the imposition of

285.
See id. at 19.
286.
See id. at 14.
287.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
4(b), Plurilateral Trade Agreement on Government Procurement arts. III, VI, XIII, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.wto.org/englishdocs-e/legal-e/gpr94_01_e.htm [hereinafter GPA]. It should be noted that the quoted language in Article
XIII § 4 does not say "economically advantageous," id.,suggesting that social and
environmental advantages may be considered so long as they are an explicit part of the
specifications. Additionally, Article VI § 1 refers not only to specifications laying down
characteristics of products, but also to those prescribing "processes and methods for
their production." Id. Government procurement is excluded from the basic national
treatment rule of GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 269, art.
III, § 8. Government procurement is also excluded from the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 1(4), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-el egal-e/17-tbte.htm. The
Agreement on Government Procurement is accepted only by a limited number of states.
See WTO, Parties and Observers to the GPA, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
gproc e/memobs-e.htm#parties (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (listing the parties and
observers of the GPA).
288.
GPA, supra note 287, art. VI, § 2(b). Since the Agreement defines a
"standard" as a "document approved by a recognized body," even private RSS schemes
may qualify if the sponsoring organizations are "recognized." Id. art. VI, § 2(b) n.4.
289.
For a related proposal inspired by New Governance theory, see Kevin

Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory Approaches in
the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 203, 242-56 (2007).
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It can also create problems of divergent

state action. In this as in other forms of orchestration, it is essential
for states to coordinate their approaches with one another and with
IGOs. Coordination reduces the costs, confusion, and conflicts of
divergent actions, while leveraging complementary capacities and
jurisdictions. In state-IGO coordination, for example, states have
limited territorial jurisdiction, while IGOs have global reach; states
have greater resources and capacities for directive action, while IGOs
have greater legitimacy because of their global representativeness
and their relative independence from particular national interests.
Thus, directive orchestration by states and IGOs is highly
complementary.
2.

IGOs

Strong directive orchestration by IGOs is rarely feasible for the
same reason that international Old Governance has often failed:
IGOs generally lack authority for mandatory action without state
consent and also for mandatory action addressed to private actors.
But Transnational New Governance opens other avenues of influence.
For example, IGOs can set conditions on benefits they offer, inducing
desired actions rather than compelling them. Here too, the most
feasible and powerful technique is to require satisfaction of approved
RSS standards to qualify as a vendor for IGO procurement, consistent
with global support for GPP. UN agencies alone procure over $10
290
billion in goods and services annually, a substantial incentive.
According to the Internet procurement portal of the UN system,
"[s]uppliers to the UN are strongly encouraged to subscribe to the
principles of the UN Global Compact."'291 This action is a good
beginning, but it is both hortatory and limited to a single scheme.
Transnational New Governance would be strengthened if IGOs did
not limit procurement conditions to schemes they themselves sponsor,
but instead integrated additional, equivalent standards in order to
encourage and even orchestrate beneficial "race-to-the-top"
competition among RSS schemes. IGOs have considerable freedom in
this regard, as they are not subject to legal constraints such as the
EU procurement directives or the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement. Of course, IGOs should still observe basic procurement
principles, such as obtaining value, acting fairly, and avoiding
discrimination.

290.
United Nations Global Marketplace, About, http:I/www.ungm.orglInfo/
About.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
United Nations Global Marketplace, Guidelines to Supplying the UN,
291.
http://www.ungm.orglInfo/Guidelines.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
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Financial IGOs have special opportunities for directive
orchestration, as they can require support for or participation in
approved schemes as a condition of financing. Two examples reflect
partial adoption of this strategy and suggest how it can be
strengthened. First, in 2002, the World Bank adopted a new strategy
to promote sustainable forest management (SFM). 292
Due to
governance and capacity problems, the strategy encourages
developing country governments "to take advantage of growing
opportunities to engage independent third-party certification bodies
in performance-based monitoring of forest . . .operations. '293 The
Bank also agreed with leading conservation organizations to
"encourage the widespread use of internationally agreed criteria and
indicators for SFM," including those of the FSC. 294 Yet while the
Bank has worked with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) to develop
new principles and criteria for certification systems, 295 it has refused
to endorse any specific RSS schemes. 296
This increases the
complexity of Transnational New Governance and misses a prime
opportunity to strengthen high-quality RSS schemes.
Second, IFC, the private sector arm of the World Bank, requires
clients and funded projects to meet demanding social and
environmental conditions. 297 But IFC carries out its own social and
environmental reviews of proposed projects and its own monitoring of
project compliance; it does not prescribe or encourage participation in
approved RSS schemes as a way to satisfy its conditions. 298 IFC says

292.

See generally WORLD BANK, SUSTAINING FORESTS: A DEVELOPMENT
(2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFORESTS/
Resources/SustainingForests.pdf.
293.
Id. at 31-32. This is consistent with the Bank's intention to implement the
strategy through partnerships. Id. at 25.
294.
Id. at 32.
295.
Id. For more on the partnership between the Bank and the WWF, see
World
Wildlife
Fund,
WWF/World
Bank
Global
Forest
Alliance,
http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/globalmarkets/forests/worldbankalliance.html
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2009).
296.
WORLD BANK, supra note 292, at 33; see Bartley, supra note 2, at 302-03
(providing an example where the World Bank merely utilized certification as a quasipolicy instrument rather than a specific regulatory scheme).
STRATEGY

297.
INT'L FIN. CORP., INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION'S POLICY ON
SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2006), available at http://www.ifc.org/

ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol-SocEnvSustainability2006/$FILE/Sus
tainabilityPolicy.pdf. For discussions of international financial institution (IFI)
standards, see David B. Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of
Environmental Standardsat InternationalFinancialInstitutions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 437

(2008), and Elisa Morgera, Significant Trends in Corporate Environmental
Accountability: The New Performance Standards of the International Finance
Corporation, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 151 (2007). Hunter observes that IFI
standards can in theory be more effectively enforced than most interstate treaties,
although in practice IFIs often rely on persuasion rather than enforcement. Hunter,
supra,at 471-73.
298.
See INT'L FIN. CORP., supra note 297, at 2-6.
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it "liaise[s]" with external initiatives to enhance the social and
environmental sustainability of its private sector projects, but
299
Here
mentions only the Global Compact and Equator Principles.
too, integrating additional schemes would enhance the impact of IFC
New Governance, and
standards, strengthen Transnational
encourage beneficial competition.
Few IGOs provide sufficient financial benefits to employ these
powerful forms of directive orchestration, and some of those that doincluding the World Bank-face complaints over their legitimacy.
But directive orchestration can operate more subtly. IGOs can
initiate RSS programs with appropriate requirements and grant their
imprimatur to participating firms. The EU "flower" ecolabel is a clear
example; so too is ISO 14001. The UN Global Compact pursues a
similar strategy, but focuses on learning and eschews strong directive
action.3 00 IGOs could potentially require participation in approved
RSS schemes as a condition for firms' access to advisory committees,
Offering multiple tiers of
meeting sessions, and the like.
participation would provide a "seal of approval" to firms with superior
levels of RSS participation, grant them a voice in the regime, and
draw on their expertise. However, this strategy must be approached
with caution, as discrimination might adversely affect IGO
representativeness and legitimacy.
IGOs can encourage states to support and steer RSS schemes
using their stronger directive techniques. IGOs that have sufficient
authority and leverage can "orchestrate orchestration," pressing
states to reach consensus on principles of RSS and appropriate
orchestration techniques. Short of that, IGOs can encourage states to
learn from successful RSS schemes, collaborate with them, and,
where appropriate, ratify and scale up their standards and
procedures. Where international agreements like GATT may restrict
orchestration, IGOs can work with states and with one another to
Less
clarify existing rules or develop appropriate exceptions.
their
coordinate
to
states
for
controversially, IGOs can provide forums
orchestration activities, and can coordinate their own activities with
those of states. 30 1 In some cases, IGOs and states may be able to
scale up successful RSS standards and procedures on a global scale by
incorporating them into international programs, recommendations, or
even treaties.
Directive orchestration by states and IGOs retains a significant
top-down character, and issues of power necessarily arise. Although

Id. at 8.
299.
Sahlin-Andersson, supra note 123, at 132-33.
300.
Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, supra note 98, at 33, suggest that IGOs such as
301.
the World Bank and ILO should develop model laws and otherwise urge states to
develop appropriate domestic regulation.
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many regulatory goals are widely shared, there remain significant
differences on many key issues-for example, how to trade off
regulatory goals against other values, such as economic growth.
Orchestration by developed states may therefore raise opposition
from developing countries concerned that domestic policies are being
dictated from outside, and from NGOs concerned that states are
imposing inappropriate tradeoffs. The same is true of orchestration
by IGOs controlled by developed countries: strong IGOs, such as the
World Bank, are already criticized on these grounds. IGOs whose
structures and procedures provide them substantial independence are
best positioned to orchestrate without generating excessive
resistance, but even they can never fully overcome issues of power:
RSS is inherently political and will always be contested.
C. Facilitativeorchestration
Facilitation is the more important form of transnational
orchestration because of the limitations on directive state action and
the weakness of IGOs in the international system. Conversely,
facilitation offers significant low-cost opportunities to enhance
international regulation, especially for IGOs. 30 2 By supporting and
collaborating with RSS schemes, IGOs and states can advance their
regulatory goals through the full "web of relationships" characteristic
of
New
Governance--"convening,
facilitating,
legitimating,
negotiating, publicizing, ratifying, supervising, partnering and
otherwise interacting." 30 3 Moreover, because facilitation entails less
top-down authority, it lessens, but does not eliminate, concern about
the exercise of power.
1.

States

States have substantial resources and already provide material
support for certain RSS schemes. For example, in addition to the
State Department's support for transnational labor schemes, the
Netherlands and the city of Bonn provide offices for GRI and FSC,
respectively; 30 4 the UK Department for International Development

302.
Emphasizing facilitation of RSS schemes would require a deep rethinking
of IGO missions and techniques, like that the UN carried out before engaging in
public-private partnerships.
303.
See discussion supranotes 89-90 and accompanying text.
304.
Global Reporting Initiative, Funding, http://www.globalreporting.org/
AboutGRI/Funding/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (stating that the Netherlands
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment
provide "institutional support" to GR1); FSC International Headquarters Moves to
Bonn, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL U.S. NEWS & VIEWS (Forest Stewardship
Council, Bonn, Ger.), Feb. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.fscus.org/images/
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(DFID) has supported the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) since its
creation; 30 5 the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO)
provided start-up financing to the Max Havelaar Foundation in
Switzerland and helps developing country farmers qualify for organic
and Fair Trade certification; 30 6 the German development agencies
30 7
BMZ and GTZ, along with SECO, supported the 4C Association;
and "at least five European governments ...subsidize NGO efforts to
promote Fair Trade coffee. '308 Such forms of assistance constitute
cheap investments for most states. Development agencies like DFID,
SECO, and GTZ are especially valuable facilitators: in addition to
their material resources, they typically maintain some independence
from government agencies that are tied to national economic interests
and are seen externally as committed to development, enhancing
their legitimacy and effectiveness.
In addition to material support, states can convene private actors
to encourage the creation of multi-stakeholder schemes, and can
participate in and collaborate with RSS schemes, influencing their
norms, structure, and procedures through their terms for
collaboration. States can also provide legitimacy and moral support
for RSS schemes based or operating in their jurisdictions. 30 9 In doing
so, states must distinguish among competing schemes based on the
quality of their standards and governance, the effectiveness of their
procedures, and their public interest orientation, so as to strengthen
those whose policies best fulfill public goals and to encourage others
to adapt. States have good information on many regulatory issues
and can disseminate it to participants in RSS. 310 States can also
disseminate information on high-quality schemes and successful RSS
practices. Finally, states can promote RSS norms by adhering to
them in their own operations.

newsletters/FSCNews.earlyfebruary_2003.pdf (announcing move of FSC's office to
Bonn pursuant to support agreement with city, state, and national governments).
305.
Ethical Trading Initiative, About, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/Z/abteti/i
ndex.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
306.

FED. DEP'T OF ECON. AFF. (SwITz.) (SECO), ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT

COOPERATION: BRIEF PORTRAIT 12-13 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/
secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_34579960 1-1-ll,00.pdf.
307.
Common Code for the Coffee Community, Sustainability and Services for
the Mainstream Green Coffee Value Chain, http://www.nescafe.com/NR/rdonlyres/
CA26CACB-CE8A-4F5A-BCFF-8C908DF55B77/67166/4Cinanutshelll.pdf.
308.
Levi & Linton, supra note 167, at 419. For other examples of state support,
see Bartley, supra note 2, at 321-22.
309.
See CASHORE ET AL., supra note 17, at 243-44 (providing examples of states
that have directly or indirectly enhanced legitimacy).
310.
The U.S. Labor Department during the Clinton administration published a
"Trendsetters List" of firms that had agreed to monitor suppliers' labor practices;
Bartley suggests, however, that the program failed because of "irrational" inclusion
criteria. Bartley, supra note 2, at 330.
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IGOs

IGOs are well situated to facilitate Transnational New
Governance, albeit with different comparative advantages than
states.
IGOs already play an important facilitative role by
promulgating standards and rules on which private RSS schemes
draw. But IGOs can enhance the "force multiplier" role of private
schemes by incorporating them as core elements of international rule
implementation strategies. The narrowest approach would be for
IGOs to adopt rules applicable to states, using traditional procedures,
but to frame those rules with an explicit view to their adaptation and
application to firms by RSS schemes. More proactively, IGOs could
encourage private schemes to adapt international rules for
application to firms, involve private schemes in international rule
making to facilitate and accelerate that process, and provide for
feedback from them. IGOs can also look to RSS rules and procedures
as they design their own norms and programs, especially those aimed
at private actors. These strategies are especially significant where
state power and resources-and thus implementation of traditional
rules-are weak.
Many IGOs are seen as relatively independent of individual
states and even more so of firms. This allows them to act as "honest
brokers" acceptable to multiple stakeholders.3 1
Because IGOs
provide neutral forums with strong legitimacy and expert support,
they have significant authority to convene multi-stakeholder groups
like those in Zone 6 on the Governance Triangle. IGO authority can
help persuade disparate actors to work together and help ensure
weaker participants that the more powerful will not take advantage
of them.
Convening also helps private actors overcome the
transactions costs and bargaining problems of collaboration, thereby
facilitating initiation of desirable collaborative schemes.
IGO
convening can also include states, encouraging their participation in
public-private schemes and their support for private RSS. IGO
convening might also: (1) engage firms with RSS schemes to facilitate
promotion, negotiation, feedback, and other interactions; (2) engage
nontraditional actors, such as investors and insurers, with RSS
schemes and firms, as in the PRI;312 (3) engage RSS schemes in an
area to work toward optimal multiplicity; (4) engage schemes with
other concerned actors in learning forums linked with IGO knowledge
production; (5) coordinate orchestration among states; and (6)
promote closer relationships between state regulation and private
RSS.

311.
IGOs made up of particular groups of states, such as UNCTAD and OECD,
may not be seen as honest brokers, but have special influence with those groups.
312.
Graham & Woods, supra note 111, at 871-72.
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Some IGOs can provide material support, as UNEP has for
GRI. 313 With their modest resources, IGOs may most effectively
support and participate in local "experiments" and demonstration
projects that provide broader lessons for transnational regulation, as
the ILO has done on a modest scale. 314 IGOs can provide valuable
technical assistance to participants in these projects. 315 IGOs often
have a legitimacy advantage over states, as their support is less tied
to national interests. States might take advantage of this strength by
funneling their support for RSS schemes through IGOs, which can
"launder" the support, freeing it of perceptions of national bias,
although only to the extent that the IGOs are perceived as
independent. 3 16 IGOs can in some cases participate in RSS schemes,
negotiating appropriate structures, norms, and procedures as part of
their terms for collaboration.
IGOs can provide legitimacy and moral support to approved RSS
schemes. IGOs could develop coordinated criteria for acceptable
principles, structures, and procedures in their areas of concern-what
Murphy calls a "code for codes" 317-- or adopt criteria developed by
others, such as the ISEAL Code of Good Practice or the pending ISO
social responsibility standard, and then grant their imprimatur to
qualifying schemes. IGOs can further apply RSS standards in their
own operations, sending a strong signal of approval. Public approval
from respected IGOs would help high-quality schemes compete for
resources and support from consumers and public audiences,
promoting a race to the top. It would also enhance reputational
benefits for firms, encouraging them to adhere. In addition, this
approach would increase the experimental benefits of Transnational
New Governance by recognizing successful experiments.
Finally, IGOs can engage in "knowledge production," drawing on
their expertise and independence; IGOs with complementary

313.
Global Reporting Initiative, Our History, supra note 53.
314.
For example, pursuant to a 1999 U.S.-Cambodia trade agreement, which
required the Cambodian textile industry to observe internationally recognized labor
standards, the ILO agreed to monitor the industry's compliance and provide technical
assistance; it continued the program, under the name Better Factories Cambodia, after
the agreement expired. International financial institutions and national development
agencies have seen the Cambodia initiative as a fruitful development strategy. Kolben,
supra note 289, at 235-42; Sandra Polaski, Combining Global and Local Forces: The
Case of Labor Rights in Cambodia, 34 WORLD DEV. 919, 924-27 (2006); see BULL &
MCNEILL, supra note 89, at 92-114 (discussing other ILO "experiments").
315.
In partnership with IFC, ILO has built on its Cambodia experience, see
supra note 314, with its Better Work initiative, designed to help developing country
enterprises improve their labor practices and gain better access to global supply chains.
Better Work, Global Portal, http://www.betterwork.org/publilglobal (last visited Feb.
16, 2009).
316.
On "laundering," see Abbott & Snidal, Organizations,supra note 145.
317.
Murphy, supra note 27, at 425-26.
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expertise might collaborate in this effort. 318 IGOs can produce and
publicize information about the impacts of particular RSS
approaches; equivalencies and differences in RSS standards and
procedures; best practices in RSS; and successful RSS schemes. By
better informing public audiences, this approach would increase the
reputational "carrots" for firms to participate in high-quality
schemes. 319 IGOs can also promote replication of best practices and
urge states to promote their use. Expert IGOs, like the ILO, can
provide technical assistance to firms or industries that wish to engage
in appropriate self-regulation and to developing countries that wish
to implement (Transnational) New Governance. 320 These knowledgebased approaches are similar to Sabel, O'Rourke, and Fung's
influential proposal for a mechanism to "ratchet" up labor
standards. 321 They would have multiple beneficial effects: promoting
comparative study and dialogue on RSS approaches, encouraging
race-to-the-top competition among RSS schemes, encouraging
standardization, and scaling up effective approaches.

VII. CONCLUSION

Transnational New Governance has arisen spontaneously in the
vacuum left by the regulatory failures of international Old
Governance. Often, Transnational New Governance is billed as a
purely private affair, and private Transnational New Governance has
had some success on a modest scale. But its success has been limited
by its extreme decentralization and the small scale of its constituent
schemes, and more broadly by a pervasive orchestration deficit. The
full potential of Transnational New Governance can only be achieved
by bringing the state back into transnational regulation.
The state operates in very different ways in Transnational New
Governance than in international Old Governance.
Eschewing
centralized mandatory regulation, Transnational New Governance
engages a softer and subtler state role as orchestrator of diverse RSS
schemes. Orchestration has many advantages at the international

318.
See id. (citing the benefit of IGO expertise in rule-making); Wood, supra
note 15, at 244-45 (describing "integrated rule-making" involving government bodies,
private actors, and interested third parties such as IGOs).
319.
Cf. Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, supra note 98, at 3 ('The appeal of this
[ratcheting labor standards] approach is that it creates incentives for prominent firms
to increase their social performance and, as they do so, generates de facto standards
with which to criticize firms with poor labor practices.").
320.
BULL & MCNEILL, supra note 89, at 99, argue that the ILO has been largely
unable to perform this function, or to engage with RSS schemes involving NGOs,
because of its tripartite structure. However, the Better Work initiative, supra note
315, moves in this direction.
321.
Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, supra note 98, at 4.
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level. It demands fewer state resources and engages the wider range
of expertise essential for addressing complex, far-flung regulatory
problems. It does not require the top-down authority that has been
elusive at the international level. Most importantly, orchestration is
compatible with the incentives of the relevant actors. Orchestration
allows states to participate in international regulation and delegate
limited authority without incurring significant sovereignty costs; it
allows IGOs to pursue their regulatory goals with less resistance from
states and greater collaboration with private actors; it allows NGOs
to pursue their normative goals and harness their capacities more
directly and effectively; and it allows firms to have a direct voice and
operating role in the regulatory system, a preferred substitute to
mandatory regulation.
Because Transnational New Governance is largely incentivecompatible, we expect it to continue to expand as states and IGOs
increase their participation in this new style of regulation. However,
progress requires a realization of the importance of orchestration and
an understanding of how best to orchestrate-a major purpose of this
Article is to deepen understanding of the value of orchestration and
the techniques through which states and IGOs can enhance the
impact of Transnational New Governance.
To be sure, Transnational New Governance is no panacea. Its
techniques are effective only to the extent that the power of civil
society, consumers, and other public audiences can substitute for that
of the state. Undoubtedly, some firms and states will evade or
undermine its impact. And even where it can be effective, its
development will be politically contested, in part because actors have
real differences over the content of standards: firms and NGOs differ
over the desired stringency of labor and environmental standards, as
do developed and developing states. The international system lacks
well-developed legal and political institutions in which to reconcile
such differences, so the specter of power looms large, as always in
international politics. IGOs are the best forums available for making
these difficult collective decisions, but their efficacy varies according
to perceptions of their independence from powerful states.
Nevertheless, we conclude on an optimistic note: for all its
shortcomings, Transnational New Governance provides both the most
viable way to strengthen the international regulatory system and
valuable new opportunities for states and IGOs to address urgent
regulatory problems.

